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Abstract. This essay treats the growth and development of Charles S. Peirce’s 
three categories, particularly studying the qualities of Peirce’s Firstness, a basic 
formula of “airy-nothingness” (CP: 6.455) serving as fragment to Secondness and 
Thirdness. The categories of feeling, willing, and knowing are not separate entities 
but work in interaction within the three interpretants. Interpretants are 
triadomaniac elements through the adopted, revised, or changed habits of belief. 
In works of art, the first glance of Firstness arouses the spontaneous responses of 
musement, expressing emotions without the struggle and resistance of factual 
Secondness, and not yet involving logical Thirdness. The essential qualities of a 
loose or vague word, color, or sound give the fugitive meanings in Firstness. The 
flavor, brush, timbre, color, point, line, tone or touch of the First qualities of an 
aesthetic object is too small a base to build the logic of aesthetic judgment. The 
genesis art is explained by Peirce’s undegeneracy growing into group and 
individual interpretants and building into the passages and whole forms of double 
and single forms of degeneracy. The survey of the flash of Firstness is exemplified 
in a variety of artworks in language, music, sculpture, painting, and film. This 
analysis is a preliminary aid to further studies of primary Firstness in the arts. 
 
                                                 
1   Revised and expanded for publication, this essay extends the argument of 
Gorlée (2008b) of Sign System Studies. Originated as an invited lecture about the 
semiotics of Peirce delivered at the University of Tartu (Estonia) on 13 November 
2008, the lecture was followed by a seminar for participating students on 16 
November, 2008 — Note that Bell’s recent review article Why Art? 
(2009) appeared when this article was ready for publication in Sign Systems 
Studies. Unfortunately, Bell’s ideas cannot be discussed here. 
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1. Dedication 
 
This essay is dedicated to Professor Paul Weiss (1901–2002), who died 
in New York in July 2002 at the age of 101. In the 1930s, he co-edited 
(with Charles Hartshorne and Arthur W. Burks) the Collected Papers 
(CP) of Charles S. Peirce (1839–1914), a posthumous edition that be-
came a beautiful adventure for modern semiotics. Weiss was widely 
regarded as an eminent scholar; his intellectual scope developed Peir-
ce’s way of signs into interdisciplinary philosophy, intermixing arts, 
religion, sports, logic, and politics. In his later years, Weiss published 
Emphatics (2000) and Surrogates (2002) about the innovative develop-
ment of Peirce’s Secondness and Thirdness respectively. After 
finishing these volumes, he worked on Adjuncts to analyze his version 
of Peirce’s Firstness. Weiss introduced the term “adjuncts” in the last 
chapter of the book Surrogates (2002: 146–173), but the manuscript 
Adjuncts was left unfinished at his death. In contrast to Thirdness and 
Secondness, which seem to be understandable, Firstness means, be-
yond a doubt, a problematic sign to comprehend, since it is a virtual 
non-sign. In honor of Weiss’ splendid work in semiotics, Peirce’s 
Firstness will be the essence of this essay. 
 
 
2. Peirce’s three categories 
 
At an early date, “after three years of almost insanely concentrated 
thought, hardly interrupted by sleep” (CP: 8.213, see Fisch 1982: xxvi), 
Peirce presented in 1867 to the American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences his paper, On a New List of Modes of Categories (CP: 1.545–
1.559 = W: 2: 49–59). After preliminary explanations and decisions 
about the revision of Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) “functions of 
judgment” that formed the “three affections of terms, determination, 
generality, and vagueness” (CP: 5.450) and even “adapting” Aristotle’s 
(384–322 BC) ten categories, Peirce “discovered” his ontological 
categories: Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness (Esposito 1980: 46–81, 
82–121). According to his private Logic Notebook, starting on this day 
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(March 23, 1867), Peirce’s categoriology remained close to his “deep 
emotion with which I open this book again” and he emphasized the 
importance to himself and his work when he added “I cannot forget 
that there are the germs of the theory of the categories which is (if 
anything is) the gift I make to the world. That is my child. In it I shall 
live when oblivion has me — my body” (W: 2: 1, see Fisch 1982: xxvi). 
The three categories constitute the foundation of Peirce’s body, 
work and thought, and all his other logical elements rest on his own 
threesome divisions, e.g., icon, index, symbol; qualisign, sinsign, or 
legisign; tone, token, or type, and further abduction, induction, deduc-
tion; term, proposition, argument; quality, relation, representation; 
unity, plurality, totality or, more concretely, images, diagram, meta-
phor; impression, conception, idea; term, proposition, argument; 
language, expression, meaning; sensibility, motion, growth; instinct, 
desire, purpose; flavor, reaction, mediation; suggestive, indicative, 
imperative; as well as other revolutionary and “evolutionary” terms of 
Peirce’s triad terminology, moving from undetermined to determined 
motifs in all realms and disciplines. The categories were identified thus 
to be the innate idea of the activity of the human mind, and their 
mutual interactivity learnt; but they were also informing about the 
idea of acquiring knowledge to inform about the world at large — to 
become the inquiry of life and science from day to day.  
There is a real connection between sign (Firstness) and object 
(Secondness), but thought — the interpretant (Thirdness) — looms 
large in Peirce’s semiotics. Peirce’s categories crisscross the postulates 
of the dual oppositions found in the Saussurean tradition of semiology, 
which Peirce dramatically revised with a non-doctrinaire receptivity of 
the semiotic signs surrounding us. Peirce’s interpretant interpreted the 
sign and the object — but he stressed that the specific predication of 
the varying interpretants to the outside world proceeds “without 
altering the fact” of the object (MS 920: 46). The three categories 
interpret (and then transpose and translate) the data from one person 
to the next to imagine, perceive, and experience to make the inter-
pretants in public reality. This is done with the function of guiding 
and stimulating further inquiry through the discovered qualities of 
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one inquirer to the community of scholars — Peirce’s dream, his 
Firstness. The human mind is capable of transforming the formless 
data, surrounding itself in reality in humanized emotions and events 
in order to make a human world of a structured dynamic organ based 
on the three interpretants. This interpreting ability we need to outlive 
and survive the world as we perceive it in reality. 
Echoing my earlier paragraphs about Peirce’s three ways of per-
ceiving and analyzing facts into categories (Gorlée 1994: 40–42) — this 
essay involves the fiction and fantasy of fine arts and will present a 
general fact in an extended version, that is some state of affairs, event, 
or episode, where fact is equated with certainty and truth (Rundle 
1993: 9–18). Firstness happens, however, before a real fact within the 
qualitative immediacy of the sign in itself, a pre-sign not related to 
anything and anyone. In the arts, Firstness can be considered not as a 
functional, mechanical, or even a theoretical sign, but will stay a sign 
in its own aesthetic value that after observation and study can become 
a varying object of speculation and opinion. Kant’s two-way division 
of casual and alert attitudes can refer to a musical sound as a 
functional or serious machinery. Weiss introduced the term “musicry” 
(1961: 122–125) to refer to the neutral and general type of musical 
compositions. Musicry concerns dinner-music (or today’s elevator or 
telephone music) that serves as background noise to accompany the 
conversation at the table or during a waiting period. To such mood 
music one does not pay particular attention; it is mechanical musicry, 
subordinate to the domestic settings (MacCannell 1976: 192). Instead, 
aesthetic music requires listening to the composition as intriguing or 
beautiful music. Attending a concert, choir, or an opera performance 
gives sensuous pleasure to the listeners (Munro 1969: 166ff.; Ehrenz-
weig 1967: 21–31), and the attention can grow into their intellectual 
pleasure.  
Peirce, who was for many years a member of amateur performing 
groups — he was a playwright, actor, producer, and director (Brent 
1993: 16, 187; see Sebeok 2001: 9) — was interested but, however, no 
specialist in the arts. Yet he pointed to the more complex three-way 
division of semiotics in his interdisciplinary classification that can be 
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applied to the action and interaction of beliefs, responses and even 
judgments of different objects of music and other arts. In music, the 
division starts with the fine senses of Firstness — tone, pitch, rhythm, 
harmony, and tempo. The primary sign claims to sense the legend of 
the real thing — the so-called “tuone” as “a blend of tone and tune” 
(MS 339: 276, see Freadman 1993: 90) — but Firstness gives no 
guarantee of the existence of reality (Singer 1984: 105–114; Spender 
1987: 504). In other arts, we find the same procedure. The meaning is 
at the beginning not logical but “only” emotional, a feeling. Logics are 
Peirce’s goal, but logics start out as illogical Firstness, needing thus to 
be guessed at to arrive at some meaning whatsoever. Firstness is the 
hardest category to understand, in spite of the fact that it represents 
“pristine simplicity” and “naïvité” (CP: 7.551, 8.329).  
Firstness means unanalyzed, instantaneous, immediate feeling of 
the sign. After observation, the receiver (seer, listener, etc.) offers 
direct “suchness” dependent on nothing else beyond itself for its 
comprehension. Peirce’s suchness is the in-itselfness of the object-sign 
offering to the audience a possible “maybe” (or “maybe not”). Firstness 
is not (yet) a factual entity but exists only in the interpreter’s imagi-
nation and is often a fictitious or hypothetical nonentity. Firstness is 
experienced in (Peirce’s examples) the pure sensation of redness or 
blackness, the feeling of acute pain, an electric shock, a thrill of phy-
sical delight, the piercing sound of a train whistle, or a stink of rotten 
cabbage (CP: 1.304). We could continue with non-Peircean examples 
such as touching a piece of velvet, the sensation of hunger or thirst, 
and the feeling of sexual pleasure or displeasure, experienced in itself. 
Some aesthetic examples of the interpretants could switch from 
activity to receptivity, that shocks rather than stuns, moving away 
from Firstness.  
Peirce’s thrill set the violent emotions of the electrical effects, sug-
gesting the pleasure, horror, or excitement of hearing the choral por-
tion of Ludwig von Beethoven’s (1770–1827) Ninth (“Choral”) 
Symphony, and the wohl-temperiertes Klavier of Johann Sebastian 
Bach’s (1685–1750) Goldberg Variations or, in other artworks, seeing 
John Everett Millais’ (1829–1896) figurative lines of the charming 
Dinda L. Gorlée  210
corpse of Ophelia from William Shakespeare’s (1564–1616) Hamlet, as 
she falls into the stream and drowns, or seeing the abstract handling of 
the human figures to express the horrors of war in Guernica (1937) 
painted by Pablo Picasso (1881–1973) — all these works do reveal this 
radiance of the created object in moments of ecstasy. After the 
impression of beauty — including the unpleasing qualities of ugliness, 
both are signs of Firstness —, the work of art can then become 
“grasped into the unity which the mind requires, the unity of I think” 
(MS 357: 2 = W: 1: 471) in order to become an opinion, and then a 
judgment. 
Firstness exemplifies any other artworks or the more functional 
(that is, non-aesthetic) common-sense impressions which are forced 
upon the human mind. Firstness compels the total sensory attention 
in order to give the artwork a pure and emotional meaning (Weiss 
1961). Peirce himself also included in his list of Firsts “the quality of 
the emotion upon contemplating a fine mathematical demonstration, 
the quality of falling in love” (CP: 1.304). Firstness is thus the general 
idea of the timeless present instant experienced as the “pure emotion 
of the tout ensemble" (CP: 1.311); in arts, a feeling of the receiver 
(exchanging into an interpreter) into his/her direct yes or no to an 
artwork (a symphony, a sculpture, or a film), prior to any real thought 
on the object-sign. One cannot “think” (or “write”) a real First, the 
words or thought themselves would take away the First’s unpsycho-
logical essence of direct sensory experience. Since Firstness is a silent 
interpretant, writing an article about Firstness is a bit of a frustrating 
activity. In Peirce’s terminology, the reader “seem[s] to attain the 
notion by a circumlocution, as what is not second, instead of 
apprehending First in its original virgin purity” (MS 906: 4). 
Whereas Firstness means undivided and undividable oneness of 
the artifact, Secondness involves the dynamic time and space of 
otherness and its two-sided consciousness, the active experience of 
action to reaction, stimulus to response, change to resistance to change. 
The idea of hitting and getting hit is a true Second, since it contains 
what we confront, elements of polarity, interaction, comparison, and 
struggle. While a First is a potentiality, a possibility, “merely some-
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thing that might be realized”, a Second is a hard fact, “an occurrence 
[…] something that actually takes place” (CP: 7.538). According to 
Peirce, “the real is that which insists upon forcing its way to 
recognition as something other than the mind’s creation” (CP: 1.325). 
Therefore, it is through the over-againstness of the brute side of 
Secondness that we face and deal with reality around us, and in this 
process of life acquire experience. Secondness offers strong opposition 
or weak resistance (muscular or intellectual opposition) against hard 
forces. All knowledge of the factual world and the more practical 
aspects of human life (such as opening a door, making a phone call, 
sending an e-mail, and kicking a football) are Seconds. Secondness is 
involved whenever we make an effort, a decision, or a discovery; when 
we orientate ourselves in time and space; or when we discover a 
surprise (CP: 5.52–5.58). Secondness differs from Firstness in that 
Secondness occurs hic et nunc, yet it must also be based upon the past 
and the lessons we draw from it. Peirce stated that “we may say that 
the bulk of what is actually done consists of secondness — or better, 
secondness is the predominant character of what has been done” (CP: 
1.343). 
Beyond the vague generality of Firstness, “a mere idea unrealized”, 
and the definite nature of “real” Secondness, “the cases to which it 
applies” (CP: 1.343), Thirdness embodies continuity, called in-
betweenness or mediation between the other categories. The inter-
mediate rule of feeling and action by general principles provide logical 
explanations and all intellectual activity is primarily a Third — this 
includes the use (and abuse) of language, although it can be em-
phasized that art is creative and avoids the rules of Thirdness. Logical 
thought, Peirce’s Thirdness, creates order, law, and regularity as op-
posed to (and out of) chaos, randomness, and chance, that is Firstness 
flowing over into Secondness. Peirce wrote that “The thread of life is a 
third” (CP: 1.337), since Thirdness mediates between the sign and its 
object. Since the assurance given by this mediation is concerned with 
continuity and generality, Thirdness is future-oriented and permits us 
(the cultural community) to predict what is to be, and to adapt our 
attitude accordingly. In art, mood (First) and fashion (Second) can 
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become cultural trends (Thirds). Peirce argued that Thirdness is the 
“eternal” value, judged again and again in the long run of human 
history. Thirdness is 
 
[...] not the kind of consciousness which cannot be immediate, because 
it covers a time, and that not merely because it continues through every 
instant of that time, but because it cannot be contracted into an instant. 
It differs from immediate consciousness as a melody does from one 
prolonged note. Neither can the consciousness of the two sides of an 
instant, of a sudden occurrence, in its individual reality, possibly 
embrace the consciousness of a process. This is the consciousness that 
binds our life together. It is the consciousness of synthesis. (CP: 1.381) 
 
All “finer” feelings and “deeper” emotions such as love, hope, and 
religious devotion, which because of their sophistication are popularly 
considered to be peculiar to the human species are considered as 
Thirds. The same is true of cognition, intelligence, and mental growth 
arising out of unconsciousness to real consciousness, the so-called 
black box (Gorlée, forthcoming). This human duty is the threeway 
“sign-burden” (CP: 5.467) we handle with care or even manipulate 
with skill.  
A threeway task of Peirce’s categories can be exemplified by the 
religious “transformation” to devotees listening to the sound of a 
chapel bell (ex. Chapel Bell from Choral Evensong 1992; ex. Bells: 
Tolling of the Knell from Requiem Mass 1997; see Neville 1996: 133–
144, 151–199), the first and main example of pure Firstness in music. 
The undetermined but intrinsic significance of the sound of the 
vibrating ringing bells is a devotional symbol. The repetitions of the 
monotonous sounds of the bells mark the call to the holy worship, 
taken over later by the determined melodies of the organ. The sounds 
of the chapel bell create a world of Firstness in the articulate space of 
the church, “detachable both from the world of everyday and from all 
objects, internal and external” (Weiss 1961: 172–173). If the “inward” 
bell sound is “recognized and generalized” (MS 1138: 16) by the 
listeners, the reference to the first “tolling of the knell” (Requiem Mass 
1997) remains a spiritual boundary, fitting into the “outward” track of 
A sketch of Peirce’s Firstness and its significance to art  213
the organ (Secondness) as the foundation of the superstructure of the 
Choral Evensong and Requiem Mass (Thirdness). The chapel bell 
passes its first threshold, crossing from a daily world into the different 
world of the sacred worship of God. In liturgical semiotics, a rite of 
passage transcends from the individual functioning of the man/ 
woman/child’s private emotion (First) to the belief of the human com-
munity (Second) until reaching the goal — the Third of the collective 
divine epiphany (or natural cosmos) (CP: 2.704, 6.446, also 2.261, 
5.554; see Gorlée 2005). 
In arts, a sophisticated example of the chapel bells is trans-
mogrified in the work of other composers, such as the continuous 
drum sounds accompanying the choir music of Ein deutsches Requiem 
(op. 45) of Johannes Brahms’ (1833–1897) Protestant oratorio (com-
posed 1861–1868, first performance in 1869 in Leipzig), illustrating in 
the argumentative text that  
 
Denn alles Fleisch, es ist wie Gras 
und alle Herrlichkeit des Menschen 
wie des Grases Blumen. 
Das Gras ist verdorret 
und die Blume abgefallen 
 
(For all flesh is as grass, 
and all the glory of man 
as the flower of grass, 
The grass withereth, 
and the flower thereof falleth away.) (1 Pet. 1: 24) 
 
This biblical passage is sung by the choral music, formally setting 
before us the vanity of man, but the nostalgic shade of the music is 
deeply tenored on the rhythmical sounds on the accompanying drum 
sounds, where cultural concepts do not exist and the bodily power of 
non-logical Firstness directly reproduces the approaching death (ex. 
Brahms 1964). As seen from post-Beethovian Romanticism, the 
mourning and consolation of Brahm’s musical cantata strikes directly 
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at the external and internal expressions of the organic forms of 
meaning, as Firstness does. 
Yet the chapel bell is fully repeated in itself in the modern 
“tintinnabuli style” of the Estonian composer, Arvo Pärt (b. 1935), 
now living in Berlin (Hillier 1997: 18–23, 86–97, and passim). The 
Oxford English Dictionary (OED 1989: 18: 131) defines the onomato-
poeic term ‘tintinnabulum’ as “a small tinkling bell”. Pärt’s later 
music — his Fratres (1977) and Psalom (1993) (ex. Pärt 1995, 1997) as 
well as his oratorio Passio Domini nostri Jesu Christi secundum (1982), 
Stabat Mater (1985) and other works — finds a new simplicity in the 
tonal harmony of the Firstness of religious music. His “tintinnabuli” 
music is, on the one hand, reminiscent of the chant of plainsong and 
Russian liturgical music; on the other hand, it probes beneath the 
smooth surface and, in the repeated melos, Pärt’s spare and emotio-
nally restrained tonality incorporates the sounds of the bell-ringing. 
The metal bells are formally filled with overtones and undertones in 
the highest and lowest register, yet the standard percussions of Pärt’s 
music is never bound to high-style convention, but is the effect of his 
own intuitive Firstness. His “tintinnabuli style” seems engaged and 
committed, but also breathes a kind of forlorn pointlessness, a 
desperate boredom. Pärt’s musical project is also a good example of 
the tendency to jump over Secondness and Thirdness, bringing to 
mind a carefully cultivated image of the minimalist role of Firstness in 
the genesis of art. 
In the 1960s art world, minimalism, a modern trend in response to 
Abstract Expressionism, was the idea of doing more with less. The 
term particularly refers to “work with a usually low degree of differen-
tiation, which is to say a monochromic (or nearly monochromic) 
canvas or a piece of music composed with only a few notes, ideally to 
suggest, at times by critical inference, meanings that would otherwise 
be unavailable” (Kostelanetz 1993: 147; see Baker 1988). The definition 
of minimalism would be “synonymous” with Peirce’s skeletal idea of 
Firstness.  
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3. Triadomany 
 
In a late essay (from 1910) Peirce confessed, tongue-in-cheek, that he 
might be suffering from a “psychiatric” disease called “triadomany” or 
“trichimania” — in his reply (or auto-reply) he wrote of “the 
anticipated suspicion that he [Peirce] attaches a superstition or 
fanciful importance to the number three, [...] he indeed forces the 
division to a Procrustean bed of trichotomy” (CP: 1.568 = MS 902: 2). 
Peirce’s response to the suspicion was negative: he stressed that he had 
no natural predilection nor a passion for trichotomies, and that in his 
logical division he spontaneously came out to the number three (CP: 
1.569 = MS 902: 3ff.).  
First, Peirce’s all-inclusive remark concentrated on artificial objects 
or “things” in themselves, with their utilitarian function with a natura-
listic basis, and representing an aesthetic, psychological nature in the 
attitude taken by the observer towards recognizing and precluding “all 
laws, fashions, and styles of every kind, as well as powers, offices, 
institutions, and appropriations (such as roads, cities, resorts), as well 
as all works of literature, musical compositions, and exhibitions, 
although it leaves included books [...]” (MS 902: 12).  
Peirce wrote that this unusual collection of various artificial objects 
was “dead” material (CP: 1.358, 6.201) but he classified them to use 
them for the purely functional, propagandistic, and educational 
“purposes for which the different things are made” (MS 902: 11, 14 in 
a MS paragraph deleted by Peirce; see Munro 1970: 269–293). The first 
task of the aesthetic experience of these objects of art is made of “heaps 
of slag and other waste material, and rubbish, which may constitute 
the first class” of what Peirce called “ornaments” (MS 902: 15, 14; see 
CP: 1.281, 5.392, 8.14). After this emotional experience of Firstness 
would arrive “separate those things which directly minister to our 
primary needs or desires” (Secondness) which implies that the “thing” 
can become the object of attention and interested contemplation. In a 
third class, then, we face “things which directly ensue us to achieve 
results, which results, however, taken in all their generality we have no 
decided natural desire to achieve for their own sake, such as to 
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generate or concentrate dynamical energy, or to make shoes” (MS 902: 
15–16) or other common-sense objects to distinguish art from science 
and other fields. Secondly, Peirce’s taxonomy of zoology treated living 
things of the living animal kingdom in a limited (dyadic) division of 
lower or less-developed and higher and more-developed parts 
(Firstness and Secondness), since the human inquirer is unable to see 
and investigate all genre-specific details of the future of the species of 
flower, animal or man. This inept application of the ongoing historical 
development means that a triadic analysis (the trichotomy) of the 
history of living things remains purely speculative (MS 902: 20–23). 
As argued later by Schneider (1952), the possibility of Fourthness is 
not real but merely a virtual reality. Since the ubiquitous system of 
Peirce-like “triangulation” (Schneider 1952: 209) seemed not to 
Schneider’s taste or mood, he added to Peirce’s cognitive triad of 
“individuality, causality, and import” a fourth grade: “importance” 
(Schneider 1952: 210). Adding such a measure of value, the “existential 
completion, enjoyment or consummation” (Schneider 1952: 211) would 
demand a last fourth phase, dealing with an ultimate state of satisfaction. 
In philosophy, human satisfaction is paid in happiness and is a fixed goal 
in empirical life, but semiotically, things are not what they are but what 
they could become. The final happiness has no real place in Peirce’s 
pragmatic dynamism, where things are not what they are but what they 
stand for to an interpreter (or various interpreters), in the attempt to 
develop with ups and downs the total community of interpreters. First-
ness can suggest a partial (visual, auditory, etc.) satisfaction to the 
interpreter, but in Secondness and Thirdness the empirical experience is 
mediated to a varying conceptual experience of factual and logical evi-
dence. This makes that the sign-action (beliefs) of sign, object, and 
interpretant can vary and change in time and space.  
Peirce’s interpretants can thus have complex, irregular, and 
unstable meanings, becoming more than primary and secondary sign-
appearances, semioticized for a certain time and space in the outside 
world. The teleological or purposive harmony of the creative process 
of sign-action (CP: 2.108, 5.494, 6.156, 6.434, 7.471, 7.570, 8.44) gives 
non-conservative thoughts between words and ideas, but still has a 
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final outcome, “semiosis”. But, in Peirce’s sense, semiosis is never 
definitive, but can be repeated again and again in time and space, 
representing the final judge now, and then taking a risk, or maybe 
adopting a different interpretant from the hands of other interpreters 
or analysts. Semiosis remains (and will utopically remain) an ideal for 
the future. Peirce’s note of gladness announced however that the 
“same division” of three trichomies would name an element 
“tetramerous (or a tetratomy), if one does not mind the cacophony, or 
dysphony” of four parts (MS 902: 16). The categories can be repeated 
and “with larger numbers [can] multiply astonishingly” (CP: 4.309) 
but our logical habits remain three and the fourth is imaginary and 
“can be dispensed with altogether” (CP: 3.647; see 1.363, 1.169, 
1.391f.). Peirce related Fourthness back to Third in the company of 
Second, and First, thereby blurring away a higher idea of division of 
more than Thirdness (CP: 1.292). 
The trigamy of Peirce’s categories — feeling, willing, knowing — 
refers not to separate entities in his three-step inquiry but knit the 
elements in a togetherness through the adopted or chosen habit of 
belief (CP: 5.476ff., 5.491; see Fisch 1986: 29, 93ff., 189). In Peirce’s 
pragmatism (from the year 1870), a habit of belief is pluralized into 
habits of belief, since we can locally and temporarily fix a belief in the 
types of regularities and irregularities we discover in the all-inclusive 
study of the sign and its object, and to embody the old and new sign-
interpretations in the sensuous, volitional, and habitual interpretant 
(CP: 2.643). The togetherness of the categories generates outward the 
immediate (emotional), dynamical (energetic), and final (logical) 
interpretants. The single and complex signs (Firstness) are only know-
able by studying their objects, and need an intelligent interpreter (or 
agent) to be understood. 
The presence of signs gives a special attention to the inner thought 
they require to be rightly understood. These terms indicate technical 
synonyms of the semiotic sign and refer to Peirce’s definitions of a 
semiotic sign as having (in a preserved copy of a letter to Lady Victoria 
Welby of July 1905) “a character with the idea of being quite roughly 
like something, or the rough impression that experience of a thing 
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leaves upon the mind” (SS: 194). Peirce gave Lady Welby the following 
working list of italicized sign-characters: 
 
Then we have mark, note, trait, manifestation, ostent, show, species, 
appearance, vision, shade, spectre, phase 
Then, copy, portraiture, figure, diagram, icon, picture, mimicry, echo 
Then, gnomon, clue, trail, vestige, indice, evidence, symptom, trace 
Then, muniment, monument, keepsake, memento, souvenir, cue 
Then, symbol, term, category, stile, character, emblem, badge 
Then, record, datum, voucher, warrant, diagnostic 
Then, key, hint, omen, oracle, prognostic 
Then, decree, command, order, law 
Then, oath, vow, promise, contract, deed 
Then, theme, thesis, proposition, premiss, postulate, prophecy 
Then, prayer, bidding, collect, homily, litany, sermon 
Then, revelation, disclosure, narration, relation 
Then, testimony, witnessing, attestation, avouching, martyrdom 
Then, talk, palaver, jargon, chat, parley, colloquy, tittle-tattle, etc. (SS: 
194) 
 
The inventory of semiotic signs is, as Peirce added, “rich in words 
waiting to receive technical definitions as varieties of signs” (SS: 194) 
in order to mix, as Peirce seemed to join in his list, the combined and 
interactive elements of Firstness, Secondness, and Thirdness. 
As a correlate to the triadic sign, Peirce related to two objects, 
distinguishing between the immediate and the dynamical objects 
(Savan 1987–1988: 24ff.; Gorlée 1994: 53ff.). The immediate object is 
the explicit and known (“inside”) object, taken at face value (Firstness 
of Secondness), whereas the dynamical object is implicit, a real but 
unknown (“outside”) object (Secondness of Secondness). The total 
sign-object is not fixed, but a possible or indeterminate fact, with 
limits “between true and false, correct and incorrect, acceptable and 
unacceptable, in the functioning of the object [...]” (Savan 1987–1988: 
27). The dynamical object elicits the “secret” information and  informs 
the sign “by a hint” of the immediate object (SS: 83). The dynamical 
object, or the object in itself, abstracted from its role in a particular 
sign-use, is the sum total of all the instances of the immediate object. 
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The dynamical object can be studied by “unlimited and final study” 
(CP: 8.183) of the diacritical marks of the immediate object in all its 
spatiotemporal contexts, and may become the end study of a semiosic 
process of sign actions. The discovery process arises from an intel-
lectual curiosity of the interpreter or analyst to doubt, and change the 
habit, and eventually to find the truth (CP: 5.370–5.387). The semiotic 
panorama includes more than a mere representation of personal 
thought, but is the intimate, close and thinking relationship of three 
logical and illogical elements to signify the liaison perceived between 
sign, the object it stands for, together with the implications of the 
interpreted or translated interpretants. The interpretants can be right 
or wrong, suppressed or distorted, and so forth. In the end, this means 
that the true opinion (the truth) is unavailable in our human inquiry; 
despite our abilities we cannot solve the world’s problems. 
The series of Peirce’s immediate, dynamical interpretants, as well as 
the final interpretant (also called the emotional, energetic, and logical 
interpretants) presents three kinds of reasoning (Firstness of Thirdness, 
Secondness of Thirdness, Thirdness of Thirdness) (Savan 1987-1988: 
48ff.; Gorlée 1994: 56ff.). The first trio (immediate, dynamical, and final 
interpretants) is limited to the stages of the interpretive process, and the 
second one (emotional, energetic, and logical interpretants) indicates 
the sign-action from the perspective of the interpreter or agent — in the 
arts, the threeway belief (Firstness), argument (Secondness) and the 
judgment (Thirdness) of the listener and seer. 
The mix of the three categories incorporates both conventional and 
unconventional statements to express the truth as a basis for negotia-
tion or action. The three categories are approached not as a meta-
phorical recipe or a fixed prescription in language: in Weiss’ (1995: 4) 
view, the expression of human “volitions, assessments, idiosyncrasies, 
love, faith, action, creativity, or evil [...] could be squeezed into 
formulae or put under categories” only if seen loosely or separately. 
Weiss, however, examined in his cooperative project the context of 
other things surrounding the object. He wrote that 
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What is needed in order to know what is real is a study that 
acknowledges factors whose existence and operation are evidenced 
everywhere, both in what can and in what cannot be formally stated, 
investigated, or understood. Account should be taken of the private as 
well as the public, of the trivial as well as the splendid. Nothing less than 
a wise-ranging, sinuous, defensible account could provide what is 
needed. (Weiss 1995: 4) 
 
Some things can be analyzed in one category, seen from without or 
within, but most things or objects can have connections to more than 
one category at the same time and in the same space. Peirce was fully 
aware of the varying connections and he stated that 
 
Viewing a thing from the outside, considering its relations of action and 
reaction with other things, it appears as matter. Viewing it from the 
inside, looking at its immediate character as feeling, it appears as 
consciousness. These views are combined when we remember that 
mechanical laws are nothing but acquired habits, like all the regularities 
of mind, including the tendency to take habits, itself; and that this action 
of habit is nothing but generalization, and generalization is nothing but 
the spreading of ideas. (Weiss 1995: 4) 
 
A practical example of Peirce’s habits of belief could be one of the 
most popular literary forms, a “biography” which is both fact and 
fiction. A biography gives a storied account of another person’s life, 
such as Florence Nightingale (1820–1910), Winston Churchill (1871–
1947), Queen Elizabeth II (b. 1926), Barack Obama (b. 1961). A 
biography is basically a flexible use of a Third: it can be a full account 
(when possible) of an individual, but its elements can also express 
some fragmentary elements, building on a report of special adventures 
(Second) or the thought (Third) of the individual. The account can be 
a written narrative (Third) but can also be (or include) illustrated 
material (First) or a filmed account (Second) of someone’s life. The 
biography can narrate an artistic (First), dramatic (Second), or 
intellectual (Third) history of the person. In My List of Great Men, 
Peirce treated Men of Feeling, Action, Thought (W: 5: 32–358; see the 
whole Study of Great Men in W: 5: 25–106, introduced in CP: 7.256–
7.266) with alas! only a handful of women included as personal icons. 
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The life of the biography forms an emotional, actional, or logical 
guideline for the readers, contributing to their individual or social re-
creation. A biography is often a biographical “novel” with special 
attention not to routines or rules but rather to special efforts of one 
famous individual, often composed after his or her death to qualify as 
a nuanced personality portrait. 
The sources of the fidelity of the biography can be a fictional and 
non-fictional account, derived from the person’s own souvenirs, 
words, letters, and photographs (Firsts) of the person including the 
assistance of firsthand information, interviews with family members, 
colleagues, and so forth, and a number of documentary biographical 
appurtenances of materials from the archives and the press, totalling a 
mingling of Seconds and Thirds. In the biography, the individual is 
often considered to be an experienced, wise, and aged hero or heroine 
(First), but the biography mainly expresses not Firstness but the 
narrative of the experiences in time and space (Second) or the 
historical events (Third) he or she played a role in. The life described 
can either be a personal life of his or her private character (First), as 
well as the occupation and temperament (Second) and milieu and field 
of endeavor (Third), or its joint combination in experiences and 
activities rescued from oblivion or human forgetfulness. The interplay 
and exchange of Peirce’s triple view makes for all kinds of ideological, 
intimate, official, critical, memorial, recollective, etc. kinds of bio-
graphy (and autobiography), presenting accounts of all sorts and with 
uncommon and alternative events revealing a compounding of 
genuine signs and less complete or deteriorated signs (Gorlée 1990), 
joining all categories together into one. 
Not to overstate the triple view of the categorical case, we use not 
facts but also fictions to make our attention to concrete and abstract 
things in real and imagined reality useful within Peirce’s triple view. 
Peirce himself wrote that he used certain “arts” in the categorical 
project, when he undertook 
 
[...] to look directly upon the universal phenomenon, that is, upon all 
that in any way appears, whether as fact or as fiction; to pick out the 
different kinds of elements which I detect in it, aided by a special art 
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developed for the purpose; and to form clear conceptions of those kinds, 
of which I find that there are only three, aided by another special art 
developed for that purpose. (NEM: 4: 51) 
 
Arguing the “artistic” (or maybe game-like) point from scratch, the 
things we study can embody one category, or we can split the things 
into sections in order to create a flow of elements into different things, 
corresponding to a variety of sections in the “game” of categories 
(Merrell 1991). The sectioning of the desire, will, and experience of 
signs means stressing one strong element accompanied by two weaker 
sub-elements in Peirce’s term, degeneracy (Gorlée 1990), as discussed 
later. In this fashion, the triadic paradigm is found by Peirce in all kinds 
of phenomena which run the whole gamut of the history of theology, 
science, physics, biology, and mathematics to achieve, when possible, the 
truth of his logical theory of signs to be the fullest by far — but always 
integrating illogical Firstness as the first background. 
 
 
4. The work of art 
 
John Dewey (1895–1952) wrote in Art and Experience (1934) about 
the deep “emotion recollected in tranquillity” perceived in coming face 
to face with the beauty of art objects, saying that 
 
Works of art often present to us an air of spontaneity, a lyric quality, as if 
they were the unpremidated song of a bird. But man, whether fortunately 
or unfortunately, is not a bird. His most spontaneous outbursts, if 
expressive, are not overflows of momentary internal pressures. The 
spontaneous in art is complete absorption in subject matter that is fresh, 
the freshness of which holds and sustains emotion. [...] But an expression 
will, nevertheless, manifest spontaneity if that matter has been vitally 
taken up into a present experience. (Dewey 1934: 70) 
 
Firstness concerns Dewey’s “operation of doing and making” of art 
objects, his poiesis (Dewey 1934: 256) to sharpen the focus of the seer 
on the aesthetic side. Yet the artistic poiesis is not limited to Firstness 
and must reach further to Secondness. Starting with the nascent sign 
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of autopoiesis (or semiotically, autosemeiopoiesis) the sign reaches the 
real aesthetic material object. Significantly, the cry might be taken 
from Edvard Munch’s (1863–1944) ambiguous one-syllable word 
Skrik — the title of his painting was accurately translated into German 
as Geschrei, yet the cry spreads into English over the more traditional 
two-syllable words (article, noun) of The Scream. Skrik cries out loudly 
to the audience, and the sentiment of anguished Firstness is trans-
formed into the real Secondness of Munch’s painting. 
Firstness produces a “self-reflexive, self-referential, relatively 
autonomous” (Dewey 1934: 256) sensuous image in the human brain. 
The impression visible (audible, touchable, etc.) in Firstness experien-
ces the qualities of the sign, actually those of a non-sign, regardless of 
the sign material (language, image, sound) and lacking part of the 
object material and part of the interpretant material. The qualities of 
Firstness are taken “in itself” (Dewey 1934: 256; see CP: 2.254, 2.276, 
5.73) and refer to the dream-like sense of color, tone, flavor, and some 
points of details as seen or improvized by the receiver or viewer (see 
CP: 1.305ff., 1.418ff., 1.484, 1.551f., 2.374ff., 5.402, 5.369, 5.395f., 6.18, 
6.198f., 7.530, 7.538, 8.335; NEM: 4: 18, 30). The attention of Firsts 
does not yet reach to see the contrasts, motives, ideas or functions that 
belong to Secondness and Thirdness. As Merrell said (1991: 3), in 
Peirce’s view the qualities of Firstness refer only to “‘atoms’” expe-
riencing “discrete items of experience”, in other words, they do not 
reach separate “things” and not “events” (Secondness) or “processes” 
(Thirdness). The ungrounded information of the fiction and fantasy of 
Firstness provides “no perfect identities, but only likenesses, or partial 
identities” (CP: 1.418). The information is therefore neither true nor 
false, but gives a kind of vague significance or, semiotically, a weak 
“reasoning” of the feeling, as we perceive in the futility of Peirce’s 
“musement” (CP: 6.452–6.493). 
As argued before (Gorlée 2004, 2005, 2007), Peirce’s term, muse-
ment’, is the speculative and intuitive way of looking at a work of art. 
Musement is a viewer’s view, a First (of Third through a Second). Its 
idea of playfulness gives a certain “reverie with some qualification” 
(CP: 6.458) to describe the exercise of art as consisting of different 
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shades of Firstness — First, Second, and Third — of meditative 
thought. Peirce spoke about its “Pure Play” (CP: 6.458) as the first 
mode of intellectual or scientific reasoning in the state of mind of his 
term of musement. The task of Peirce’s muser is to freely see, hear, 
touch, and so forth, a puzzling object, phenomenon or event. The 
investigator’s assumption gives an unthinking, intuitively formed, and 
spontaneously chosen personal belief, working with no plan or 
strategy but spontaneously supplying his or her plausible hypothesis 
for the observed work of art. The musement of the whole work and its 
more detailed formulations of the work of art deal with the inquirer’s 
musing, self-returning inwardized thought, to catch our own likeness, 
both physical and spiritual. Musement is a creative response, even a 
caricature of the sign we face, a belief indulging in a daydream without 
spending “real” time in the “idle” activity. The playfulness is loose and 
free of responsibilities, since musement stimulates indifference to the 
methodological imperatives that we are deeply concerned with in our 
daily lives. The muser embodies his or her own dream version 
subversive of ordinary life. In Peirce’s view, logical beliefs and opi-
nions start with this drifting and fluctuating dream, a vague, unseen, 
incoherent feeling to arouse the real semiosis in the further categories. 
The work of art combines the apparently logical with large doses of 
the absurd. The non-sign is no more than a minimal shape, for Peirce 
a primary “airy-nothingness” (CP: 6.455), a first “possibility, then, or 
potentiality, [as] a particular tinge of consciousness. I do not say the 
possibility is exactly a consciousness; but it is a tinge of consciousness, 
a potential consciousness” (CP: 6.221). The waking consciousness of 
the paradoxical Firstness of the art object is a sleeping consciousness 
of the muser. But the muser reads some traces of Firstness in the work 
of art and adds to and explores the musing dream between satiety and 
mystery. In the dramatic mise en scène, the artwork reaches through 
the qualities explored a spontaneous Firstness, but often an intensified 
Firstness, reaching forward to hypnotize about the relationship 
between other and oneself (otherness and selfhood). There is some 
repulsiveness and fascination in the first glance of the “raw material” 
of Giovanni Lorenzo Bernini’s (1598–1680) baroque sculpture of the 
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Ecstasy of Saint Teresa (1652). The qualities of the Spanish saint stand 
out in the chapel of Santa Maria della Victoria in Rome. Animated by 
her own body, she “moves” forward in a theatrical light. Saint Teresa’s 
body is engulfed in religious meditation with eyes heavenward rolling. 
The realism of Bernini depicts the bodily qualities of her orgasmic 
pleasure — in the company of a smiling angel.  
In pop-art, Andy Warhol’s (1928–1987) film Blow Job (1964) sees 
the images in the Andy Warhol Museum (Pittsburg, PA, USA) in 
order to observe in this film an aesthetic factor of rhythm and har-
mony. Through the viewing through a cinematic “keyhole” the 
voyeuristic close-up picture-qualities of head and shoulders of an 
emotionally (or erotically) aroused man moves the viewer not to 
criticize or to reject him in his intoxicated state (Gidal 1977: 111). 
Mystical or meditative picture-qualities conjure up the sensory 
stimulus in artistic life, sought not through didactic knowledge, but 
intimately touched with beauty and transformed by lust and passion, 
or perhaps drifting into the vacuum of fatigue, boredom, sexual excess, 
or drug addiction. Firstness frequently exudes sexual and sinister 
images of an ambiguous and a hidden note of “pornography”. 
Portrait sculpture indulges our taste for the timeless beauty of the 
human face and body. The art of multiplication may be able to depict 
the logical “truth” (Third) but not without indulging in the illogical and 
paradoxical enchantment of the heart (First), as seen in the examples 
(Second). In the reality of fine arts, Secondness is a central figure of 
“organized” beauty, impersonally shaped in three or two dimensions in 
stone, ceramic, bronze, or wood, or pictured in two dimensions in a 
photograph, film, or painting, as well as in “one” dimension (or 
dimensions) in music. The visual aspects of the images tell the story of 
aesthetic pleasure (and impleasure) to make visible the personal 
narrative — the coloratura (or vocal color and timbre) — of the 
“melodic” ornamentation from model to artist (sculptor, painter, 
photographer, and so forth) and to be able to create interpretants of the 
viewer (spectator, listener, and so forth). Outside the material and the 
context used, the silent visibility of the qualities of Firstness is turned 
flesh in the shameless and barefaced representation of dead Ophelia 
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floating in the river, the Christian nun’s intimate carnal love to Jesus 
Christ, and the brash intrusion on a drug addict’s private sphere. 
Beyond the mastery of art works, we can enjoy musement in the 
humming of the washing machine (Wunderbarer Waschsalon, 1994), 
an appliance with the rotating movement of the basket and the 
balancing water, seen through the cosmic round door. The washing 
machine, with its warm temperature, pleasing scents, and silent pauses 
between the phases of the machine, provides a spatiotemporal division 
and cleaning combination from dirty to clean laundry — a day-
dreaming adventure or cosmic meditation to counter the meaningless-
ness of life. In the launderette, the body and mind of the muser’s ego is 
spiritually cleaned in the unconscious and uncontrolled musement, 
emptying the mind through a dreamy act of love, concentrating on 
nothingness and integrating the onlooker into the wholeness of the 
universe of discourse. Musement is exploring a supreme quality felt by 
the “artist” corresponding to the primary “suchnesses” (CP: 1.303–
1.304, 1.424) of the emotional and expressive attitude of abductive 
Firstness — integrated with the factual reality of inductive Secondness 
and maybe the logical law of mind of deductive Thirdness — to push 
forward to Peirce’s meditative wholeness of semiosis. 
Summarizing the experience of Firstness versus the other cate-
gories, Firstness concerns the “[f]eeling-qualities, or sensible qualities, 
either unobjectified or attached each to an object. In themselves, they 
are not definitely objectified, since they involve no reflection whatever, 
and therefore no thought that they are within or without” (MS 1135: 
15). For comparison with Firstness, Secondness is more than feeling, 
but counters the artistic “measure” of spatial and temporal dimensions 
in the arts (dance, music, sculpture, painting). Secondness is the 
“[c]onsciousness of effort and resistance [and provides] essentially a 
consciousness of a within and a without, correlative to one another” 
representing “here and now, differing in this from the qualities which 
are not definitely located” and “[f]rom this kind of consciousness are 
derived the ideas of brute force, reality, existence, relation, etc. Under 
this head I place all the common experiences of life, all that is real to 
all men” (MS 1135: 15).  
A sketch of Peirce’s Firstness and its significance to art  227
Secondness integrates Firstness but is again contrasted with Third-
ness. Thirdness must integrate Secondness and Firstness, and involves 
dynamic and compound interactive forms of art (film, opera). Trans-
posed into logical forms, Peirce wrote that Thirdness is  
 
Consciousness of something as a medium between two things. This 
involves the idea of intellectual pertinence “involving” the idea of a rule 
of thought. Thus, if A gives B [to C], the A is a sort of medium between 
B and C, unless what is meant is merely that A lays down or throws 
away B and that as an unsettled fact C takes B, — in which case there is 
no genuine mediation — then the essence of the giving lies in a 
psychical act by which A communicates to C the idea that B is to belong 
to him. If A shoots a bullet into C, and is in anyway responsible, he at 
least ought to have thought that the bullet would reach C. Thus every 
triadic relation moves consciousness of thought. This sort of conscious-
ness is involved in all scientific knowledge, or knowledge properly so 
called. (MS 1135: 15–16).  
 
In the work of art, Firstness is affective or qualitative “thought”, or 
better non-thought, that gives no real information or knowledge but a 
virtual quality of the first emotion felt (German: erste Empfindung). 
Like a non-sign intuitively affiliated to existing signs, the intuitive 
quality can be transferred upwards to the wholeness of the interactive 
categories. Firstness is, as previously described, a fragmentary sign or 
zero sign, but is still “dense, vague, and pregnant with promise” (Savan 
1977: 179) to crystallize into Secondness and Thirdness. For Peirce, a 
zero element is a “negative of quantity” of meaning, but has a special 
quantity, which is “no violation of the principle of contradiction: it is 
merely regarding the negative from another point of view” (MS 283: 
109). The zero sign is itself a sign of emptiness, but its radiance points 
in some discontinuous direction. Nothingness will stay muted in 
reasoning until “existing” in Secondness, reknitting the ‘imagined’ 
Firstness (CP: 8.357) in reality. Pure Firstness “signifies a mere dream, 
an imagination unattached to any particular occasion” (CP: 3.459), 
whereas practical Secondness serves to “denominate things, which 
things he identifies by the clustering of reactions, and such words are 
proper names, and words which signify, or mean, qualities” (CP: 
Dinda L. Gorlée  228
4.157). The meaning of the simple lexical, musical, pictorial, etc. form, 
Peirce’s iconic replica, can become repetitive, involving a hardening of 
the soft and controversial separation and connection, difference and 
sameness; trying hard to accommodate to the jointure of one category 
to another. Firstness and Secondness decided to join “brick and 
mortar” (CP: 6.238) to define the physical change in Peirce’s archi-
tectural framework, the “clay” of the logical meaning of single signs 
depends on the critical thought to enlighten the specific pragmatic 
contextualization. Then, within the real context, the simple unit would 
be upgraded to become an actual “building” message. 
In Peirce’s logical semiotics, the upgrading “grounding” sign-
shades of qualisign, sinsign, or legisign (CP: 2.243f.) — also called tone, 
token, or type or, more concretely, images, diagram, metaphor — 
include “a mere idea or quality of feeling”, an “individual existent” 
until a “general type […] to which existents may conform” (MS 914: 3) 
in accordance with the order of the three categories. Tone (image, 
qualisign) is the mere sign itself, token (diagram, sinsign) is the object-
oriented sign, and type (metaphor, legisign) is the ruled sign, often in 
language (Savan 1987–1988: 19–24; Gorlée 1994: 51–53). Transposed 
into musical signs, Firstness is called “tone”, Secondness “passage”, 
and Thirdness “piece”. In painting and sculpture, we can call the 
categories “point”, “line”, and “composition”. In Languages of Art, 
Goodman (1985: 177–221) spoke of “score, sketch, and script”, which 
can be transposed to other arts. Bayer (1986: 9 and passim) has 
characterized it in this way “Punkt, Strich, Linie und Flache” (whereby 
“Strich” and “Linie” may be synonymous) and his repertoire of artistic 
sub-signs are characterized as “Farb-Form-Einheiten” and “Figur-
Grund-Differenz”. Speaking about the clarity of things in painting, 
Updike (2008: 14–16) mentioned the “touch”, “sweep” and “dash of 
the brush” to depict the clarity of “painterly” things. 
Peirce’s zero or “blank form” (CP: 8.183) of the meaning-pictures 
of the loose word, sound, smell, or touch is a simple speculation of 
Firstness we make, “unattached to any subject, which is merely an 
atmospheric possibility, a possibility floating in vacuo, not rational yet 
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capable of rationalization” (CP: 6.34) and unrestrained at first by 
concerns for logic and accuracy. Peirce wrote that 
 
[…] when man comes to form a language, he makes words of two 
classes, words which denominate things, which things he identifies by 
the clustering of their reactions, and such words are proper names, and 
words which signify, or mean, qualities, which are composite 
photographs of ideas and feelings, and such words are verbs or portion 
of verbs, such as adjectives, common nouns, etc. (CP: 4.157) 
 
Consider the creative versatility of the linguistic use (or abuse) of 
“dirty” four-letter words, such as the tabooed expression “fuck you”, 
which can describe, just by its First sound, pain, pleasure, love, mating, 
and other sensations, depending on the contemporary or historical 
context; such as “Oh, fuck!”, “Holy fuck!”, “How the fuck are you!”, 
“Fuck me!”, “Fuck you”, “Where the fuck are we!”, “Who gives a 
fuck?”, “Fuck George Bush!” as well as the last words of General 
George Armstrong Custer (1839–1876): “Look at all those fucking 
Indians” and, last but least, the immortal words of the Captain of the 
Titanic: “Where is all this fucking water coming from?”, after the 
collision in 1912 with an iceberg in the Atlantic, when the ship rapidly 
filled with water and could not be saved (Montagu 1967: 307–315, 
Arango 1989: 16, 119–123, 143–157). It seems that the custom of 
swearing by the purely verbal but non-thematic utterance of four-
letter-words gives a content of positive and negative ideas. 
Steiner observed that “nonsense poetry and prose, nonsense 
taxonomies, and nonsense alphabets of many sorts are an ancient 
genre often active just below the surface of nursery rhymes, limericks, 
magic spells, riddles, and mnemonic tags” (Steiner 1975: 187). The 
universe of nonsense languages consists of bits of pure Firstness, 
accumulated towards the pseudo-series of nonsense-speech. As 
example, see the naive children’s poems, such as  
 
Eeny, meeny, miny, moe 
Catch a tiger by the toe 
If he hollers let him go,  
Eeny, meeny, miny, moe. 
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Peirce called the counting rhyme “children's gibberish” with “gipsy 
numerals [...] employed in counting nearly as the cardinal numbers 
are employed” (CP: 4.155). Nursery rhymes give an illogical and 
nonsensical Firstness, but despite the trick test of free speech they still 
have inarticulate violations of form and shape, and they have an 
expressive meaning. Yet these meanings are the primary signs of pure 
sensory delight of the game, but with a fierce attachment to a vague 
and futile quality to further in the upcoming categories. Firstness can 
be repeated and is thus unfolded in actual Secondness with a direction 
of time and place, turning into a fluid flow of interactive signs and 
sounds, Peirce’s pseudo-Thirdness. Other linguistic and poetic 
examples of Firstness, derived from Peirce’s interactive categories, 
would be a possible analysis of twentieth-century stage plays. Consider 
the mysterious atmosphere of Samuel Beckett’s (1906–1989) dramas 
(En attendant Godot 1952, Waiting for Godot, transl. by Beckett, 1954, 
and other plays), the absurd economy of Harold Pinter’s (1930–2008) 
stage plays, and other plays. The ambiguity of “Serio-Comic Groping” 
(Booth 1974: 212, see 257–267) evolves from or into the “prerational 
darkness and chaos” (Coetzee 2008: 15) of the voices of Firstness, as a 
preliminary “program” to enjoy and use the ironic inversion in the act 
of creation. 
 
 
5. The genesis of the artist 
 
Firstness happens in sporadic signs, and can develop into the episodic 
scenes of Secondness (in jargon, proverbs, epigrams, quotes, sayings, 
haikus, etc.). After weighing the weak meaning of the sporadic non-
sign out of context, the historical evidence will give anecdotal 
impressions to see the meaning of some aesthetic (and non-aesthetic) 
artifacts and their context. Eco’s historical exposé states that 
 
At first contact and first reaction, exhibitions assume the form of an 
inventory, an enormous gathering of evidence from Stone to Space Age, 
an accumulation of objects useless and precious, an immense catalogue 
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of things produced by man in all countries over the past ten thousand 
years, displayed so that humanity will not forget them. (Eco 1987: 292) 
 
Eco’s “catalogue of things” is named as 
 
Spires, geodesic domes, molecular structures enlarged millions of times, 
cathedrals, shacks, monorails, space frames, astronauts’ suits and 
helmets, moon rocks, rare minerals, the King of Bohemia’s crown, 
Etruscan vases, Pompeian corpses, a Magdeburg sphere, incense burners 
from Thailand, Persian rugs, Giuseppe Verdi’s cravat, cars, TV sets, 
tractors, jewelry, transistors, wooden statues from the Renaissance, 
panoramic views of the fairytale landscapes, electronic computers, 
boomerangs, an Ethiopian lion, an Australian kangaroo, Donatello’s 
David, a photo of Marilyn Monroe, a mirror-labyrinth, a few hundred 
prefabricated dwellings, a plastic human brain, three parachutes, ten 
carousels [...]. (Eco 1987: 291–292) 
 
In this wandering fairyland of objects, how does the impressionistic 
(or anecdotal) evidence of the collection alert the art viewers to enjoy 
what is art separated from “art” (or even “pseudo” art)? 
If we pursue the articles in Iconicity (Bouissac et al. 1986), the 
Festschrift for Thomas A. Sebeok, his efforts would exemplify the 
historical growth and development of the “prefigurements of art” 
(Sebeok 1981). Sebeok (1981: 211) analyzed the genesis of art growing 
from the expression of the “love of decoration”, displayed by certain 
animals. Despite Tinbergen’s statement that human and animal 
behavior do not have a common language, we can still compare visual 
landmarks of human behavior in a mixture of anthropological terms 
(Tinbergen 1975: 61–174). In Sebeok’s view, the examples of ki-
nesthetic, musical, pictorial, and architectural signs show clearly what 
the dance behavior by bird songs, finger paintings by chimpanzees, 
nest making by beavers, and other activities engaged in by animals, 
can mean (Sebeok 1981: 216–249). The theoretical remarks are 
exemplified in an analysis of selected passages of animal “art”, in 
which Sebeok shows the abductive Firstness in the anthropo-
morphizing fine arts of animals. Seeing a compilation of human traces 
of Firstness, we may catch a first glimpse of the workmanship that at a 
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later date would mythologize fragments of the poetic atmospherics of 
Firstness in human arts — and see how invisible Firstness is unfolded 
in the inductive reality of visible Secondness. 
The reasons of art (or “art”) objects can have a historical origin, 
from animal to man, but may also have a biological foundation 
running from Peirce’s “undegenerate” signs to “degenerate” signs. In 
Peirce’s logical and mathematical view, the symbol is the only genuine 
sign, and the index and icon are degenerate signs. Yet the com-
pounding of the three categories in some signs reveals both genuine 
signs and less complete (or deteriorated or impure) signs, that is 
Peirce’s term of degeneracy (discussed in Gorlée 1990). Degeneracy is 
evolved in Peirce’s writings from 1885 to 1907 (see Gorlée 1990: 89–
90). After 1904, degeneracy became involved in his later theory of 
varieties of sign, in which degeneracy is mentioned and integrated in 
an evolved sense (MS 339C: 498). Peirce wrote in 1909, 
 
There are two kinds of second, the external or normal, and the internal 
or degenerate. For example, all relation[s] implies a second, but identity 
is a kind of relation which makes a thing second to itself. [...] We speak 
of motives or allurements as forces, as if I were under compulsion from 
within. So with duty, and the voice of consciousness. An echo is my own 
voice coming back to answer itself. All likeness is mere internal 
secondness, — an identity in the characters of the resembling things. [...] 
By the Third, I understand the medium which has its being or 
peculiarity in connecting the more absolute first and last. The end is 
second, the means third. A fork in the road is third, for [sentence 
incomplete] In place of the words, first, second, third, I might almost as 
well have used, “beginning, end, and middle”, — the word middle 
corresponding to third not to second. (MS 906: 3–4) 
 
Both Thirds and Seconds can have themselves degenerate forms. In a 
degenerate Second, the Secondness partakes of Firstness and is called 
degeneracy to a first degree; in a degenerate Third, the Thirdness 
partakes of Secondness and Firstness and is called degeneracy to a 
second degree (Gorlée 1990). However, Firstness may have some pre-
Firstness which is what Peirce named, only once in his Collected 
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Papers, as the unspecific and undetermined spirit of undegeneracy 
(CP: 1.383). 
The undegenerate and natural pre-form of Firstness forges its 
mélange with Secondness (and Thirdness) to become a cultural artifact. 
Peirce wrote that 
 
The work of the poet or novelist is not so utterly different from that of 
the scientific man. The artist introduces a fiction; but it is not an 
arbitrary one; it exhibits affinities to which the mind accords a certain 
approval in pronouncing them beautiful, which if it is not exactly the 
same as saying that the synthesis is true, is something of the same 
general kind. The geometer draws a diagram, which if not exactly a 
fiction, is at least a creation, and by means of observation of that 
diagram he is able to synthesize and show relations between elements 
which before seemed to have no necessary connection. The realities 
compel us to put some things into very close relation and others less so, 
in a highly complicated, and in the [to?] sense itself unintelligible 
manner; but it is the genius of the mind, that takes up all these hints of 
sense, adds immensely to them, makes them precise, and shows them in 
intelligible form in the intuitions of space and time. Intuition is the 
regarding of the abstract in a concrete form, by the realistic 
hypostatization of relations; that is the one sole method of valuable 
thought. (CP: 1.383)  
 
The intuitive abilities of primitive man make iconic (image-like) traces 
of Firstness into weapons, tools, or even works of art, confronting not 
only the immediate environment but eventually with time facing the 
world at large. Ginzburg observed that 
 
Man has been a hunter for thousands of years. In the course of countless 
chases he learned to reconstruct the shapes and movements of this 
invisible prey from tracks on the ground, broken branches, excrements, 
tufts of hair, entangled feathers, stagnating odors. He learned to sniff out, 
record, interpret, and classify such infinitisemal operations with 
lightning speed, in the depth of a forest or in a prairie with its hidden 
dangers (Ginzburg 1990: 102, see Ginzburg 1983: 88 and Ginzburg 
1979) 
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Historically, the “animal” responses of the identification methods of 
human individuals are “readable” — that means, in Firstness, ima-
ginable — skills used in archaic and modern hunting, shooting, and 
fishing activities as well as used in modern forensic techniques. These 
strategies, bounded by the necessities of survival versus death, create 
the undegeneracy of a physical translation from pre-social and pre-
cultural signs of pre-Firstness to the social and cultural signs of 
Firstness.  
Recently I visited the city of Tartu. There is a cultic stone kept for 
memory, known as the sacrificial stone (Salupere 2006: 98–100, 64–65 
ill.) with identificative marks to shed human and animal blood within 
the holes and curves of the stone. According to Frazer’s classic The 
Golden Bough, the sacred stone with the pagan icons was “simply a 
precaution against witchcraft” (Frazer 1963: 273–274, see 38). Further 
Frazer (1963: 50) commented the magical sense of the person’s 
“impressions left by his body in sand or earth”. Indeed, the shapes of 
foot tracks, fingerprints, bloodstains, followed by the seals with 
pictured impressions and the X rays, ID photographs, name stamps, 
initials, autographs, and signatures — see today’s public and personal 
email addresses and websites — are magic signs. “Automatically” 
(Dewey 1934: 227) created as undegenerate traces of selfhood, their 
shapes are real and their form perceived in Secondness, but these 
bodily signs are a fugitive hint of Firstness (Black’s Law Dictionary 
1999: pp. 129–130 “automatic/ism”, p. 648 “fingerprint”, p. 656 
“footprint”, p. 982 “mark”, p. 1146 “passport”, p. 1387 “signature”, p. 
1412 “stamp”). Expressing everyday practical objects or parts of the 
human body, these undegenerate signs are by most of us believed to be 
physical and personal imprints. The copy imitates a visible image 
enabling us to communicate a de-formalized or subjective “idea” of 
the formalized indication of the individual person. This “idea” is no 
more than an improvization (Firstness), secretly keeping a name secret, 
but it must be stressed that there is no scientific means of deciding the 
control of the visual or digital human identity (no Secondness) of the 
person. The pre-ontological experience of the material traces of 
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selfhood is no more than an illusory promise, but is officially con-
sidered a formal, even “legal” copy. 
The marks, stamps, and traces are regarded in fairytales and 
legends “sympathetic magic, where any person has to be careful in 
disposing of finger-nails, excreta, hair, and the like — since each item 
of the disjecta membra retains a significant trace of the identity that 
gives to the sorcerer holding the part a measure of control over the 
whole” (Shands 1977: 20). Following Sebeok’s semiotic analysis of the 
magic of Cheremis “charms” (Sebeok 1974: 14–36, originally 
published in 1953), the idea of disjecta membra appears in beautiful 
charms, attractive to the receivers. Sebeok gave to the cultivated charm 
a mythical content of prayer for health, love, and weather conditions. 
The “historiola” (Sebeok 1974: 24–26) of the pre-Firstness of magical 
charms are basically undegenerate sign-events, taken without genuine 
psychic awareness from natural history to intimate identity, as it is or 
seems to be, without legal evidence and without the artistic playfulness 
of art. They may be helpful for group identity for anthropologists or 
archeologists, but singularly unhelpful for the legal identification of 
the authenticity and legal certification of a specific natural person 
(Black’s Law Dictionary 1999: 127-129 “authority”, 220 “certification”) 
— who knows what is what? Semiotically, the genuine First (of First) 
of the physical nature is thus rooted in “ignorant” functions — that 
means, unconscious and unauthorized bodily signs — taken from 
living individuals to serve as some legal proof to the community. Foot- 
and handprints as well as other identification marks constitute an 
imperfect record of selfhood, since the sketchy meaning of the zero 
signhood represents almost Peircean “airy-nothingness” (CP: 6.455).  
Used by the police as an evidence of personal well-being or public 
security in the atmosphere of terrorism today, the functional traces or 
marks of a person can be scanned by electronic capture, recorded, and 
accounted for real authentication or certification (versus minor or 
major variations in copies and clones). The abductive nature of these 
confessional acts lays bare a central feature: they measure some visual 
and imaginable clarity of the real identity of the individual, but they 
emphatically provide nothing as a clear narrative clarity, in the sense 
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of legal evidence of the person involved. The dangers of the testi-
monial techniques of undegenerate signs are improvized traces and no 
more, and must thus constantly be violated by new and more 
advanced methods to resist a total identification outside the given 
immediate environment of the “animal” world, to handle a fixed 
context facing the verbal and nonverbal human communication of 
both the literate and illiterate world spheres. As borderline cases of 
public and private signs, consider the “decorative” imagery of rune 
inscriptions, the Mesopotamian tablets, Chinese or Japanese 
pictographs for “ignorant” Western amateurs, or written texts (in any 
language) that do not “look like” script but as pictorial images to a 
child or adult illiterate.  
Undegenerate signs can grow into degenerate signs, and dege-
nerate signs may eventually develop into art. In his article “Tribal 
styles”, the art historian Gombrich  retraced the mechanical analogy of 
the knitting pattern which offers instruction for a sequence of stitches 
for carpetlike designs (Gombrich 1987: 26–27) — as today in Navajo 
carpets and Oriental kilim rugs. Weaving is one of the oldest arts, and 
serves as a historical example of art, but we see that the term 
“decorative” loses its specific meaning for the symbolism of tribal art. 
The technique for pattern-weaving is not personal and playful but 
stays strictly programmed, according to the spiritual mythology of the 
shapes, images, and colors used in the religious nature of the group. 
This traditional craft and technique, even with slight innovations, 
cannot yet be considered the art of an individual weaver. Gombrich 
wrote that this point was made long ago by Franz Boas, the founding 
father of modern anthropology, who made clear in his classic work, 
Primitive Man (1st ed. 1927) that 
 
When the purely decorative tendency prevails we have essentially 
geometrical, highly conventionalized forms, when the idea of 
representation prevails, we have, on the contrary, more realistic forms. 
In every case, however, the formal element that characterizes the style, is 
older than the particular type of representation. This does not signify 
that early representations do not occur, it means that the method of 
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representation was always controlled by formal elements of distinctive 
origin. (Boas 1951: 354) 
 
Long before Boas, Peirce discussed in 1907 the semiotic workings of 
the Jacquard loom, the first machine to weave in patterns, exhibited in 
Paris at the Industrial Revolution (1801). He wrote that the Jacquard 
loom produced, as he called them, primitive icons — that is, “quasi-
signs” with a qualitative likeness to the object (CP: 1.473). Peirce’s 
statement of pre-Firstness — “quasi-signs” — illustrated the possibility 
of the development from this “purely brute and dyadic way [with] 
automatic regulation” to a tertiary design of a textile weaver. Peirce 
clarified that “it will be convenient to give a mere glance” (CP: 5.473) 
to produce the first interpretant. The abductive “mere glance” of the 
textile or the carpet implies dramatic variations of meaning-giving 
interpretants to appear as novelty to the outside world. 
Cultures have dominant technologies in order to shape their own 
technomorphic designs, yet “real” art disrupts the seers in delightful 
ways of Firstness, and stands for new and abductive art. Breaking out 
of purely functional or totemic emblems for the ethnic group (Singer 
1984: 105–154; Lévi-Strauss 1963), artistic selfhood opens up with the 
ethnocultural Firstness of the undetermined and undecided motifs 
representing events and thought-signs of children’s drawings, early 
cave paintings, Egyptian hieroglyphs, tattoos, Oriental ideographs, 
voodoo dolls, American cryptographs, and in comics and folk-tales. 
The familial feeling of a doubly degenerate sign — First of Second — 
spreads to the austere naturalism of “primitive” art styles towards 
singly degenerate signs — real Second — made by the mastery of a 
particular artist. The style disrupts in a “potential mood” but stays 
inside the fixed “imperative, or indicative” tradition, showing the 
artist’s cry, “‘See there!’ or ‘Look out!’” (CP: 2.291), familiar to 
Munch’s later cry. In the degeneracy of the work of art, logicalism 
remains out of focus and tribal and subjective emotionalism is brought 
into sharp focus. The image of the group instinct and religious feeling 
is transposed from folklore into subjective painting, music, and other 
art forms, and gives in art-making “a kind of self-enjoyment, though 
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involving an inner detachment or psychological distancing of the self 
from itself” (Aldrich 1963: 13). The distance from reality will direct the 
artworks to the struggle of Secondness with and against reality. 
Gombrich called ethnocultural art “zebra crossings” that occur in the 
“living fossils” (Gombrich 1987: 23, 26) of evolutionist art today. 
A few examples of the growth of the emergent status of art until 
well into the twentieth century will celebrate how doubly degenerate 
art can grow into the individual styles of singly degenerate art. The 
musical “vocabulary” of the Brazilian composer, Heitor Villa-Lobos 
(1887–1959) imitates the exotic sounds of Brazil’s Indians, including 
the carnivalesque dances and songs, bringing them into Western 
modernity (ex. Villa-Lobos 1996; Tarasti 1995: 126–127). Villa-Lobos’ 
cantata Mandú-Çárárá that builds on “syllables of a ficticious Indian 
language, jakatá kamarajá”, spreading from the tenors to the mixed 
chorus, whereas “the male voices’ stifled, onomatopoetic Hum Tum! 
[stays] reminiscent of an Indian dance” (Tarasti 1995: 128–130, 370–
372). In Villa-Lobos’ A Floresta do Amazonas (Dawn in a Tropical 
Forest; ex. Villa-Lobos 1991), the listeners are introduced to a musical 
“copy” of the sounds of the Indian jungle and the fauna of the 
Amazonas. Villa-Lobos turned the indigenous Firstness of natural 
birds and animals into elements of his modern fantastical insight — 
building his musical Secondness. 
The eminent Peirce scholar Merrell (1995: 158) transfers doubly 
and singly degenerate signs to “contemporary painting, and its co-
unterparts in our high-tech, fast-track world of mass media (television, 
videos, movies)” as we see — inspired by the American pop-art's 
graffiti, animation, etc. — the sketchy human figures drawn by Keith 
Haring (1958-1990) on his path back to a ritualistic way of being in the 
world. Modern art can be adorned with a patriarchal and patriotic, or 
even sentimental stage of nostalgia. This new harmony is perhaps 
based on Paul Klee’s (1879–1940) formal and imaginative human 
icons — small visual elements with line, color, and shapes of Surrealist 
and Dadaist origin — out of which the painter builds the total order 
and the mystified balance of his “multi-dimensional” and 
“polyphonic” pictures (Ehrenzweig 1967: 25). Consider the example of 
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the Swiss-Italian sculptor Alberto Giacometti’s (1901–1966) narrow, 
long, and thin upright figures from the years 1950–1960. His almost 
one-dimensional human silhouettes are transformed into sinister and 
meager caricatures of figures (Ehrenzweig 1967: 17, 144). Giacometti’s 
sculptural likeness was directed against traditionalism and naturalism, 
but his modern prototypes of individual persons are clearly 
reminiscent of the Firstness of African art. His “primitive” Firstness of 
the bodily lines has the fugitive and even fleeting meaning of Peirce’s 
“airy-nothingness” (CP: 6.455).  
Another example of the modern use of the ethnocultural icons is 
the Italian sculptor and painter Mimmo Paladino’s (b. 1948) 
mixography of human figures, pointing way back to a fairytale past 
(Paladino 1985). Building a bridge between two worlds, Paladino’s 
bronze and iron sculptures, drawings, woodcuts, and linos present a 
charming and witty synthesis of a modern artist to the “art” of some 
other historical civilization. In Paladino’s sculptural “poems” (or 
metapoems), icons are vaguely interconnected and deconstructed to 
the figures, in such a way that the complex of the artwork makes the 
primary Firstness of the “tribal” art of the mythical characters. The 
icons are found in “vulvar, phallic, cruciform, sticklike, egg-like 
ideograms, cup marks, cup and ring marks, hand prints, foot prints, 
and animal tracks” (Anati 1994: 138). The iconic superimpositions on 
human figures make “modern” signs beside or beyond the 
rudimentary historical indications (sub-signs) of some previous art. It 
makes the viewers more conscious of Paladino’s modern expression 
and (probably his) entertainment, transforming disparate materials 
into new art, creating some mysterious place with an indeterminate or 
possible meaning, similar to ideograms or hieroglyphs (Kuspit 1985: 
18). 
 
 
6. Archaic iconography and beyond 
 
The modern shapes and forms of iconicity of Haring, Klee, Giacometti, 
and Paladino seem to be “synonymous” with the historical “art or 
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script” (Bouissac 1994) of the rock paintings in pre-civilized days. 
Rock art was painted by the first artists in the Paleolithic era of c. 
6,000–14,000 years ago (and some considerably further back). Spi-
ralled back in time to witness the archeological or quasi-archeological 
nature of art, the ancient discoveries of ethno-graffiti are today 
considered not only in the anthropological and historical but also in 
the psychological and religious sense. As Carl Gustav Jung (1875–
1961) wrote: 
 
From the very beginning of human society we find traces of man’s 
efforts to banish his dark forebodings by expressing them in a magical 
or propitiatory form. Even in the Rhodesian rockdrawing of the Stone 
Age there appears, side by side with amazingly likelife pictures of 
animals, an abstract pattern — a double cross contained in a circle. This 
design has turned up in practically every culture, and we find it today 
not only in Christian churches but in Tibetan monasteries as well. It is 
the so-called sun-wheel, and since it dates from a time when the wheel 
had not yet been invented, it cannot have had its origin in any 
expression of the external world. It is rather a symbol for some inner 
experience, and as a representation of this it is probably just as life-like 
as the famous rhinoceros with tick-birds on its back. (Jung 1975: 96). 
 
The mythology of the Paleolithic rock art — “abstract art” painted on 
the rocky surface of the walls and ceilings in the remote caves, rock 
shelters, and cliffs, inhabited by Stone Age proto-people — contains 
both undegenerate and degenerate signs. In many areas, art — 
painting as well as music and dance — seemed to take up more time 
than any other activity, devoted to basic needs for food production 
together with the procreative and sexual functions (Boas 1951: 299ff.). 
Art was no hobby but seemed to be a specific talent of Homo sapiens. 
The rock paintings express stylized images of species such as 
rhinoceros, mammoth, horse, bison, bear, ibex, and reindeer. Beyond 
the artistic copies of the movement of animals, there exist the 
unindividualized “stick figures” of man (or woman) (Gombrich 1996: 
12; see Gregory 1987: 45–46; Herminione 1996) together with copies 
of human handprints and other icons painted on the rock (McNeill 
2006: 21–22). In the pattern of artistic expression that emerges from a 
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lengthy pre-cultural period, the “copied” imprints suggest the 
evolutionary Firstness of the untamed (undegenerate) and measured 
(degenerate) signs, contributing at a later date to personal art-signs 
(Ehrenzweig 1967: 139, 173; Gailli 1996: 29, 41 ill.).  
The caves show authentic relics produced over some 40,000 years, 
but they still remain in situ to be researched as cultural heritage. Most 
caves (Altamira, Lascaux, and others) have depictions inside, pre-
serving abstract images of bits of charcoal or red-ochre as vivid 
sketches reproduced in the darkness of the rock caverns; but those in 
the Portuguese Cõa Valley are hardly visible designs in open air rock 
surfaces. Over time, the serigraphic sights of scenes and events are 
bound to lose their tone, shape, and color, through erosion, rainfall, 
storm, snow, and ice falling on the rock. The vision of the future 
visitors and scholars of palaeoart must conjure something from 
nothing, or almost nothing — an inconclusive evidence indulging in 
“subjective hunches” (Gombrich 1996: 10) to give a meaning to the 
imaginary images and ambiguous fragments. Sebeok would guess the 
meaning of  
 
[...[ stick-figures, cartoons, sketches, paintings, photographs, and a host 
of other possibilities for pictorial representation, with varying degrees of 
accuracy [where] the perception of all depictions, moreover, varies 
across species, cultures, and times. For example in the crowd scene [...] 
are the people fighting, dancing, or engaged in some other activity? 
(Sebeok 1984: 17; see Bouissac 1994: 355) 
 
Recapulating in the pseudoart the characteristic silhouettes of archaic 
animals, hunters, breeders (and later farmers) (Anati 1994: 131–134), 
tribal or group art (called anthropological art) is then and now 
considered as the first “childhood of mankind” (Gombrich 1996: 8). 
The drawings have a twisted perspective on the flatness of the painted 
surface: the animal is drawn in profile and the body in full face. 
Coincidentally, this twisted perspective was followed from pseudoart 
to modern art — taken up by Picasso’s “objects” who observed the 
“semiotic twist” of the earlier examples of Iberian (and other) 
sculptures and reliefs in his collages and assemblages (Quinn 1995). In 
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terms of giving the work of art a mystery, rock art goes back to where 
we started, in the undegenerate fossil record with a degenerate sacred 
meaning (Highwater 1994; Jung 1975; Gorlée 1990). The starting 
development of the human race seems to include artistic portrayals of 
magic rituals — are the caves sanctuaries? — and social scenes — such 
as dancing or warfare, or hunting, fishing, and angling — performed 
together as clan totems (McNeill 2006: 20; Lévi-Strauss 1963).  
The purely deictic function of rock art is the form of expressing 
group art, whereas the emergence of personal artistry is primarily 
expressed in the next phase, starting with child art (Ehrenzweig 1967: 
3–20, 290). The abstract or “primitive” drawings with the reverse 
perspective occur “in the transition between symbolic play and 
imagination” (Krampen 1986: 148) in the footsteps of Jean Piaget’s 
(1896–1980) mixed Saussurean-Peircean definitions of the drawing 
and its psychological background. The following age phases appear in 
the children’s free drawings: 
 
— [rhythmic] scribbles pertain to the phase of sensorimotor intelligence 
(age 2–3) 
— fortuitous and failed realism (= synthetic incapacity) are connected to 
the preoperational stage of       concrete mental operations (age 3-5) 
—  intellectual realism is connected with the transition from the pre-
operational stage to that of concrete mental operations (age 5-8) 
— visual realism presupposes concrete mental operations (age 8-12) 
(Krampen 1986: 150) 
 
The infancy of drawing seems to overlook “a crucial difference 
between child development and hominid evolution — namely, that the 
former is dependent on adults for its survival, while the latter had to 
be highly successful survivors at every single stage of their evolution” 
(Bouissac 1994: 363). Naturalistic (that is “primitive”) psychology is 
really the stylized effort of play and imagination to extend the 
historical course from doubly to singly degenerate signs. In tribal art, 
the copying of geometrical figures into something else, a more 
personal expression, would clash with the artistic icons of Firstness. In 
the evolutionary sense, the artist starts from a romantic-expressive 
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image (Firstness) to reach the trivial-didactic “mythology” of develop-
mental art (Secondness), which must be learnt to be understood. 
Archeological art is a catalogue of “uprooted” objects coming today 
in fragmentary states. Partly broken, with some pieces missing, and 
the surface worn, they need reconstruction to see the whole form — 
interpreted from Firstness upgraded to Secondness and even to 
pseudo-Thirdness. The free-standing figure of the Greek (Hellenistic) 
masterpiece of the Venus of Milo (dated to around 2nd Century B.C., in 
the Louvre, Paris) is, despite her height of 1.8 m., a fragmentary 
symbol (Boardman 1994: 192, 193 ill.). Found in the Aegean island of 
Melos in 1820, she lacks both arms, but the female beauty of the body, 
the fluidity of the lines and the contrast between the folds of the 
draperies and the nudity of the torso transformed her into the statue 
of female beauty for all times (Curtis 2003). Venus is portrayed in 
classic style following the features and conventions of nude studies. 
Despite the old pose, in the present variant of the sculpture Venus’ 
head is based on a twisting movement, and her body turns in different 
directions in such a way that the statue looks like a moving sculpture.  
As the Venus of Milo, most classical statues have long lost their 
head, eyes, noses, arms, or legs, see The Winged Victory of Samothrace 
(c. 190 B.C., in Louvre, Paris). The colossal figure of an arched body in 
marble (height 2.4 m.) is poised upright with spread wings, and seems 
to be resisting the wind, which is flattening the soft folds of fabric 
against the body (Dewey 1934: 234). The Winged Victory, a symbol of 
military success, was erected to commemorate a victory of the fleet of 
Rhodes at Samothrace (Boardman 1994: 190, 191 ill.). As Dewey 
observed, the definition of the style is not clear-cut, particularly the 
expression of the drapery in bronze-casting, which expresses the 
artist’s mood in the play of folds forcing the spectator to move around 
the statue in a twisting pose. Since the 1950s discovery of the figure’s 
right arm, it is thought that the right arm was stretched high to 
announce the victory. Together with Venus’ arms, there is in both 
statues a “possibility” of meaning of the energy pushing the movement 
forward from classical features to the masterdom of new artistry 
(Boardman 1994: 191, 193 ill.).  
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Venus and Samothrace start an epic memory of artistic selfhood for 
the sculptor and the spectator. The artist stayed inside the despotic 
tradition of cultural perspective and convention — that means double 
degeneracy developing towards single degeneracy with authentic 
surprises of “specialized” artistry that did not follow the sculptor’s 
model. Peirce wrote that “I have my doubts whether Greek sculptors 
of that age used models as ours do. I think the canon and their 
memory guided them mainly” (SS: 194). Yet Peirce added to the 
general “type” a personal “‘token’”, on the contrary, — literally, = 
French coup” (SS: 194), in English the effort of an creative knock or 
kick. The abductive impression of the sculptures is no “melodic” 
tradition, according to the current fashions, but reflects the personal 
vision of the “reality” of the artist him/ herself. The statues’ graceful 
and explosive movement reflects the artist’s abductive art — Firstness 
moving until Secondness of art. 
As an excursus, the tourist attraction of ancient Pompeii, the 
archeological city on the Bay of Naples that was destroyed by the 
eruption of Mount Vesuvius in 79 A.D. Pompeii is today a touristic 
setting that, however, is decaying and, in part, left in ruins, with fallen 
stones and frescoes with faded or disfigured surfaces. The discolored 
fragmentariness happens through time, the radiance of sun, and 
falling rain drops is similar to rock art. Significantly, Pompeii also 
lacks manpower to undertake the project of the cultural heritage. Not 
considered “art” but speculatingly “art for science’s sake” are the 
displayed excavated bodies of the Roman citizens. The “pseudo-event” 
(MacCannell 1976: 103f.) of offering the display of real bodies, 
exhibited in glass boxes, serves as a living cabinet des curiosités for the 
visitors of the Pompeii “museum”. The nude twisted bodies contorted 
into anguished poses are transformed into exotic museum pieces 
showing to the visitors undegenerate signs with a “possible” meaning. 
The physical bodies are thus turned into virtual degenerate art, similar 
to the imagery of the frescoes, mosaics, and statues, deflecting the 
military, artifactual, and leisure activities of life of the Roman holiday 
resort. 
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The discoveries of Pompeii have been excavated under cinders and 
ashes, and become archeological findings in the modernized museum, 
where undegeneracy is linked with degeneracy. In the Pompeii 
museum or gallery, both physical and real signs are located as art in 
the showcases to amuse and entertain the more than two million 
visitors each year. This quasi-official status of art with “art” exhibits, as 
a subject of the Pompeii controversy, all kinds of objects to be 
“consumed” in their educative, ethical, and aesthetic roles (D’Ambra 
1998) — despite the real historical fact of the actual volcano eruption, 
a catastrophe surprising everyone in the daily life of Pompeii. Art and 
“art” (including “pseudo-art”) in Pompeii is no outward form of 
specific art of shapen and misshapen bodies and faces, recognized by 
marks of undegeneracy and degeneracy. Pompeiian life everywhere on 
the streets can only be understood through knowledge of what 
happened in the life and times of the Roman Empire (Beard 2008), 
that is outside primary Firstness. 
If we return from archeological fragments and other portions of 
Secondness back to the undirected pre-forms of Firstness, we see that 
flashes of pure Firstness in other arts represent the nothingness 
involved in the sign(s) and/or the object(s) within the “possible” 
interpretants. Some practical examples of the mindless, wordless and 
imageless belief of the nirvana (a First directing to Third) in the art-
sign would compose and arrange the viewers’ fantasies (Firstness) into 
reflections (Secondness), making the strange obvious and eloquent. 
Since Firstness is a non-sign, the examples are already signs of 
Secondness and perhaps some Thirdness is integrated to reflect an 
interpretive meaning not of a fragment or details but of a whole piece. 
Richard Wagner’s (1813–1883) opera Das Rheingold (discussed in 
Gorlée 1996: 422–426; 1997: 252–264) — written between 1853 and 
1876 to be performed as Vorabend of the whole Ring des Nibelungen 
cycle — begins with an introduction (Vorspiel) transpiring at the dark 
bottom of the Rhine. The introduction is played during 4'36 minutes 
by the “underwater” orchestra without any stage performance. The 
watermusic is built upon one point, the third tone E flat. From this 
leading Ur-note (Firstness) three motifs gradually seem to grow from 
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nothing to a continuous crescendo played by different instruments — 
from strings to brass, woodwind, etc. — to provide a musical frame-
work (Secondness). The murmuring arpeggio motif is shifted by a 
broken chord growing into a wavy musical pattern (Apel 1946: 52–54 
“arpeggio”; 103 “broken chord”). Indeed, from nothingness to 
richness, the object of Wagner’s Vorspiel eventually breaks the chords 
up and down, extends the tempo, and interpolates foreign notes. The 
objectual complexities of Wagner’s prelude come from within and are 
left unknown (or “anonymous”) to the listeners, yet by being 
outwardly repeated and developed — Wagnerian leitmotif — they will 
at liberty open up in possible interpretants of the opera itself 
(Ehrenzweig 1967: 54, 91f.). The wave motif, lifting upwards through 
the dark shades of the turbulent Rhine water, symbolizes the 
brightness of light. Wagner’s Valhalla music suggests a First indica-
tion of something deep in shadow — from an “oceanic” level (Ehrenz-
weig 1967: 120, 192, 294f.) the sunken treasure is raised from the deep 
bottom of the river. This revelation explains the further search in 
Wagner’s tetralogy — after Das Rheingold, we have the three 
remaining operas, Die Walküre, Siegfried, and Götterdämmerung — to 
find the hidden treasures of gold, love, and success (Tarasti 1979: 78). 
Wagner’s arpeggio motif was echoed by Camille Saint-Saëns 
(1835–1921) in his Third Symphony in C minor, also called the 
“Organ” Symphony (1886) scored for vast orchestra, but with a flair of 
bringing a dramatic variety of orchestral color, also played by a piano 
and an organ (ex. Saint-Saëns 2001). This Third Symphony was 
composed by this musical craftsman at the highpoint of his brilliant 
career, and is now almost forgotten. Saint-Saëns was not only a French 
Wagnerian but had a “flair for assimilating everything assimilable in 
Berlioz, Liszt and Gounod” (Abraham 1964: 180). The theme-
transformation was not only shown in Saint-Saëns’ charming Car-
naval des animaux: fantaisie zoologique (1866) and the seductive 
music of the popular opera, Samson and Delila (1877). From 1858, 
Saint-Saëns was, aged just twenty-three, the organist of the volu-
minous organ at La Madeleine in Paris. He varied the orchestral 
symphony with his love for organ music and Gregorian chants. The 
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Third Symphony was a heterogeneous “motto-theme” (Abraham 
1964: 172) sporting all of Saint-Saëns’ technical skills in a kind of 
“rhapsody”. The Symphony had four different movements: the first 
movement, a slow introduction of Adagio — Allegro Moderato “imi-
tates” Wagner’s Vorspiel to Das Rheingold, leading further to a lyrical 
theme. In the second movement, Poco Adagio, the organ starts with 
the musing undertones of the lowest register, almost the inaudible 
sounds of the chapel bells. The overtones of the organ come in the 
concluding Maestoso — Allegro movement. Yet Saint-Saëns’ romantic 
and lyrical melodies are considered as superficial and cool harmonies, 
missing the dark pathos of Wagner’s tragedies. 
The musical examples have shown the high and low tone-sounds 
reflecting pure and polyphonic tones of the melody, the slow and 
quick tempo, the flat and sharp pitch and loudness and softness of 
tonal timbres, the spoken and sung rhythm, together with the chro-
matic harmony of consonant and dissonant chords (Apel 1946: 753 
“tone”, 497 “note”, 736 “tempo”, 584 “pitch”, 747–748 “timbre”, 639–
642 “rhythm”, 322–325 “harmony”). They intermix in the function of 
musical Firstness, its transition into Secondness and pseudo-Thirdness. 
Peirce wrote in his Logic Notebook (1865–1909), on a handwritten 
memo dated from July 8, 1906, that “A Tone as that whose accidental 
being makes it a sign. A Token or that whose accidents of existence 
make it a sign. A Type or that thought upon which makes it a sign” 
(MS 339C: 499). To make the distinction in music, this triad pertains 
to the voice or instrument, the written signs, and the notational 
systems: a tone embodies material properties, a token signifies the 
condition of the musical action, a type is a significant rule affecting 
musical notation (CP: 4.537; see Freadman 1993: 88ff.). The pictorially 
symbolic and graphic system of arbitrary signs translated into 
performance indicates pitch, duration, and song (or score). In musical 
genres, the triad tone, token and type affect together the categorical 
elements of expression, tempo and nuance with rhythms, harmony, 
and tune. 
Taking the sounds of the chapel bells and the monophonic (uniso-
nous) Gregorian chant as a base, the written and sung syllable and 
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accent is musicalized in the later medieval and Renaissance anthems of 
Orlando Gibbons’ (1583–1625) polyphonic music in the English 
tradition. Gibbons was the English composer and organist of the 
Chapel Royal and the Westminster Abbey of the Tudor period, around 
the same time as the liturgical reform of church music in the hands of 
Martin Luther (1438–1546) in Germany (Gorlée 2005: 26, 66–76), 
both are hallmarks of the new chants of the church, stigmatizing the 
Catholic tradition and moving into revival movements leading to the 
modern consciousness of Humanism and Reformation. Gibbons’ 
organ intermixes with the lyrical types of the English high voices in his 
vocal church music. In Praise the Lord, I My Soul, Lord, We Beseech 
Thee, and the anthems (ex. Gibbons 1983–1984), the polyphonic 
settings of the hymns and the psalm tones are attuned to the old-style 
“treble” and “mean” boys’ voices or, an octave lower, the man’s 
countertenor. This vocal mélange (solo or accompanied with organ) 
mastered the absolute counterpoint of the choirmaster’s art — 
preparing the way for the musical declamation of the oratorios of 
Henry Purcell (1659–1695). The fragments of Gibbons’ original 
designs, as they have survived today from the second half of the 
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century, bury in the performances the 
vocal and musical instruments together in one single lyric tone color 
and artistic harmony of pure Firstness. Beyond the elastic limits of the 
melodic Firstness, the holy words “tell” the narrated faith in Thirdness, 
brought together in Secondness. Anthems are a “wilderness” of vague 
words with fuzzy edges, but this problematic fact makes faith and 
reason come together.   
In modern days, the natural sound of the Brazilian jungle sounds 
are fictionalized in Villa-Lobos’ folk-like musical style, the mythology 
of the chapel bells has echoed in the unconfined spiritual Firstness of 
Pärt’s “tintinnabuli” style, together with the other examples. The 
unreal, non-sign simplicity of Firstness can be given a space in a 
meaningful Secondness and Thirdness. In terms of the possibility of a 
meaning, the leaning toward “nothingness” of artistic Firstness was 
fully exploited by Wagner’s “stationary spread of sound, albeit 
animated by interior motion” (Dahlhaus 1985: 107). He introduced in 
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his operas the antithesis of the “popular” or “childlike” with “classical” 
and “refined” elements (Schwab 1965: 131; Gorlée 2008a: 118). Wag-
ner’s narratives of self-sacrifice, redemption, and revelation, clothed in 
his sentimental tunes, would grow into the popular(ized) music 
performed in the music hall, operetta, ballet, and the musical. 
Wagner’s dynamic movement between nature and culture, between 
intuition and knowledge, and between banality and mythology, deeply 
determined the vigor of primary Firstness in post-Wagnerian music 
and other arts. 
  
 
7. Other flashes of Firstness 
 
During the second half of the nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
notions of art, other modern composers, painters and film-makers 
repeated in orchestral music, painting, and film the minimalist techni-
que of using examples of artworks, reconciling and upgrading the idea 
of Firstness.  
Jean Sibelius (1865–1957) — after his versions and revisions of the 
Fifth Symphony (Op. 82, 1915–1919) — inaugurated a release bor-
dering on a “functional economy” (Whittall 1988: 10–11). In Peirce’s 
semiotics, this is a “silence” form of Firstness, a foreboding of some-
thing new. The changing “emotional map” (Whittall 1988: 12) turned 
the innovative Finnish composer into an experimental stage, moving 
from “absolute” symphonies to a new mixed genre: symphonic tone-
poems. Sibelius introduced the magical mood of Firstness in his tonal 
music, such as En Saga (1892, rev. 1902), Voces intimae (Op. 56, 1909), 
The Bard (Op. 64, 1913, rev. 1914), The Oceanides (Op. 73, 1914), 
Prelude to a Tempest (Op. 109, 1925), and Tapiola (Op. 112, 1926) (ex. 
Sibelius 1991, 1998a, 1998b; Whittall 1988 18–24).  
Wagner’s prelude to Das Rheingold and the storm in Die Walküre 
inspired Sibelius’ Tonmalerei (Dahlhaus 1985: 101–102, 106, 121). In 
the tone-poems, the natural world, inspired by the nationalist and 
nostalgic depiction of the epic Kalevala, leads to an “oceanic” feeling 
of magic (Ehrenzweig 1967: 294f.). Sibelius’ musical miniatures 
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introduce Peircean icons of the timeless forces of nature in the dark 
Northern winter in “a single frozen moment: a painting” (Whittall 
1988: 24) transposed into music. The mysteries of the Finnish forests, 
the cries of the swans and cranes, and other natural wonders have lost 
the controlled consciousness of sign and object, and are for the 
listeners transformed into a vague vision seen “through a glass, darkly” 
(1 Cor. 13: 12). The musical icon is “not the [very] thing [and] the 
distinction of the real and the copy disappears, and [the musical 
painting] is for the moment a pure dream” (CP: 3.362). 
Tone poems are programmatic music, their “likeness” sets Sibelius’ 
Firstness to musical “reality”. The Bard is a short tone poem, musically 
picturing Johan Ludwig Runeberg’s (1904–1977) poem of a “primi-
tive” musician that after a life-work returns home to die. The Bard 
shows the simple chords of a solitary harp as the only solo instrument 
(Firstness). The symphonic poems, The Oceanides, derived from the 
nymphs of the ocean of Kalevala and based on Homeric mythology, 
and Prelude to a Tempest, are derived from Shakespeare’s (1564–1616) 
The Tempest. The musical poems are incidental pieces with the main 
program of “graphically” depicting the natural “monotony” of the 
ocean waves and the wild storm (Firstness) in musical signs. Tapiola, 
the twenty-minute orchestral composition completed in 1926, is 
Sibelius’ last major work. The final work is about Tapio, the forest god 
of Finnish mythology. Tapiola is a nature-inspired combination of the 
“fragments” of the programmatic tone-poem and Sibelius’ “whole” 
seven symphonies. Based on one short home chord of B minor (First-
ness) that is repeated throughout the work, the whole-tone harmony 
of the tone poem depicts the physical or mental storm in the Finnish 
forests. Tapiola represents the “infinite varieties of life in the forest, all 
of which spring from a common source” (Johnson 1959: 168). Peirce’s 
Firstness represents the Creation of Firstness.  
Firstness is transmuted into Secondness through the intensified 
concentration on the growth of different aspects of the single idea of 
Firstness. Within the string quartet of Voces intimae (Inner Voices; ex. 
Sibelius 1998b), the instrumental monolog between first violin and 
cello in the opening measures undergoes the musical evolution of 
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making degenerate signs. The strange sounds grow into a polyphonic 
and chromatic dialogue of tragic despair, “creating something out of 
nothing” (Johnson 1959: 167). This double procedure is also criticized 
in En Saga, musically derived from the Nordic Edda runes 
(Tawaststjerna 1968: 192; see Tarasti 1979: 102). To musically depict 
the “vague title” (Johnson 1959: 60) of the song, En Saga presents a 
monotonous dialog of bassoon and bass, giving a rhythmical “whir of 
pizzicatos and arpeggios” to make together an “archaic clumsiness of 
the main theme itself” (Tarasti 1979: 103, see Tawaststjerna 1968: 193–
198). 
Sibelius’ nationalist drama is nicely illustrated by his own archeo-
logical experience in the year 1911. When Sibelius was walking in the 
shore of Lake Vittråsk, he happened to find a series of barely visible 
visual carvings on the edge of the steep rock cliffs, dating from 1500-
500 B.C. (Kartunen 1995), a period from which no written documents 
have survived there. Sibelius performed a solitary quest of climbing 
over rocks and seeing the primitive images of, as we guess, an elk 
figure and a fishing net — an epic discovery of Finland’s first primitive 
artform. His discovery of rock carvings in danger of being lost must 
have determined his self-critical gaze and influenced his inter-
disciplinary “forging” (as he himself put it) (Kilpeläinen 1995: 18, 22) 
of the separate scraps of tone into fragments to compose the whole 
pieces. 
Wagner’s and Sibelius’ vague “aboutness”, giving a single-minded-
ness to the lyrical qualities, unfolds in different shades of Firstness in 
later composers. Against the Wagnerian flamboyant and expressionist 
associations of this time, there is the Firstness of Eric Satie’s (1866–
1925) simple piano chords, played alone in the miniatures of 
Gnossiennes (1890–1897), Gymnopédie (1887–1888), and many other 
quiet piano pieces (Whittall 1988: 196–197). The rhythmic pulse has a 
classic but obscure feeling of spiritual release, a sign of pure Firstness. 
The indeterminate duration (tempo), also a sign of Firstness, is left to 
the pianist: there is the “fast” interpretation of Aldo Ciccolini (ex. Satie 
1971 [1966]) and the “slow” performance of Reinbert de Leeuw (ex. 
Satie 1995). Satie’s balancing silence of the tones and passages makes 
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for an overall melodic simplicity that has become the trademark of 
Satie’s quasi-mystical music. Making a living as a bar pianist, Satie’s 
adult years were devoted to religion and politics. He composed for the 
Ordre de la Rose-Crois Catholique and was the founder, member, and 
composer of the French church, Eglise Métropolitaine d’Art de Jésus. 
On the other hand, Satie also wrote cabaret and ballet music. Although 
later audiences were impressed by the intensity of his piano music, 
despite or because of the recurrent clichés, they were also baffled by 
Satie’s First monotony of tonality, chromatism, and tempo. 
Olivier Messiaen’s (1908–1992) Éclairs sur l’au-delà ... (composed 
in 1987–1991) is another contemporaneous exponent of globalized 
Firstness, composed by a modern French composer, organist, and 
ornithologist. This orchestral piece is Messiaen’s last work (ex. 
Messiaen 2004; Hill and Simeone 2005; for previous works see 
Whittall 1988: 216–219, 226–231). Messiaen was a religious (Catholic) 
composer and his musical testament depicts the illuminations of 
“flashes of the beyond” (tr. of Éclairs sur l'au-delà) to reach Paradise. 
Messiaen was totally “dedicated to the task of reconciliating human 
imperfection and Divine Glory through the medium of Art” (Whittall 
1988: 216). The natural, but musically not “simple”, Firstness of 
Messiaen’s music had no fixed metric scheme, while he lengthened 
and shortened the tempo of the note or fraction, while repeating 
magical sounds of non-European music as well as a musical versions 
of bird sounds. Using a series of undetermined meanings in his 
essential Firstness, Messiaen engineered the 11 movements of Éclairs 
sur l'au-delà ... to reach Paradise. Messiaen was an untraditional 
composer and he wrote this new serial music (Holtzman 1994: 88–91) 
to illuminate his own “natural” and “supernatural” tastes.  
Messiaen seemed to prefer the abductive mood of the tribal ideas 
of the great Assyrian, Sumerian, and Indian cultures, including their 
astronomy, numerology, and bird songs (Gorlée 2008a: 157–159, 174). 
Tarasti (1979: 116–117) called Messiaen’s (earlier) style an “exotic” 
mythology, meant in the structural sense of mystic versus natural signs. 
Within Peirce’s semiotics, Messiaen’s musical experimentation and 
avant-garde exploration is a prolonged musement based on Peirce’s 
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Firstness. The interpreters (director, musicians, listeners) must appeal 
to their feeling and emotion to understand Messiaen. By the way, 
Peirce called his Éclairs an illuminated “flash”, meaning for Peirce an 
“abductive suggestion [...] an act of insight, although is extremely 
fallible insight” (CP: 7.181; compare Peirce’s favorite term “flash” in 
CP: 1.292, 1.412–413, 2.85, 4.642, 5.45, 7.36, 7.498, 8.41–42). The flash 
is known, but the object of the flash is in part unknown. Similar to the 
episode of the chapel bells, the sign (and sign-fragment) can be 
repeated and the repetitions accumulate towards a final manifold. In 
other words: the composer Messiaen gives access to the supernatural 
and his musical way makes a path to nature or God. 
Linking Sibelius’ and Messiaen’s engineering of notes and frag-
ments to Wagner’s leitmotif structures, this compositional process is 
also applied to the spare and alert tones-and-durations of Henryk M. 
Górecki’s (b. 1933) musical work. During three decades, Górecki lived 
under the Communist control of musical aesthetics in Poland, but 
despite his antipathy to the Communist authorities and the ideological 
environment in which he lived, he followed his own new radical 
direction from 1960 on, until he became internationally known from 
1990 on (Thomas 1997). Górecki’s music builds a bridge from liturgy 
and folksong from Silesia in the Bohemian Tatra Mountains to his 
avant-garde pieces of a free serial technique. His musical style is 
derived from past culture and folklore in his homeland, Poland, but is 
modernized in Górecki’s theological works with a mystic view. His 
Third Symphony (Op. 36) with the English title Symphony for 
Sorrowful Songs for soprano and orchestra in 1976 (ex. Górecki 1994) 
was a silent lament of war in the face of death (Thomas 1997: 81–94). 
It was followed by Lerchenmusik (Op. 53, 1984–1985) and Arioso 
(from Quasi una Fantasia, Op. 64, String Quartet No. 2, 1991; ex. 
Górecki 1995b; see Thomas 1997: 120–128, 135–144). Górecki had a 
fascination with all kinds of percussion instruments and introduced in 
his choir works the punctuating rhythm of the church bells, see also 
his Kleines Requiem für eine Polka (Op. 66, 1993; Thomas 1997: 144–
149, for church bells 47; ex. Górecki 1995a).  
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Górecki’s technique is an “elemental” or undecided style with a 
seemingly modal simplicity but with an extremely compositional 
complexity. His pure Firstness becomes an interplay of fast tempos 
with slow sections, where melodic motion is suspended. The apparent 
lack of motion (his silence) in which the “general lack of motivic 
consistency — despite a degree of spasmodic intervallic correspon-
dence — gives the work a loose, improvisatory air”, forming a parallel 
to church chanting (Thomas 1997: 27). In an interview in 1968, 
Górecki said that “all [compositions] tackle the same problem, that of 
putting the most stringently restricted material to maximum use” 
(Thomas 1997: 55). Despite the scrupulous economy of minimalism, 
the tonically static sound material of the simple and motionless major-
minor chords (Firstness) builds in intensity to become dissonant with 
harsher sounds to achieve a speed in configurations and sequences 
(Secondness) to build up the definitive (never final) moment of 
Thirdness.  
Like the composers in Firstness in music, new visual languages also 
pioneered in other arts. The nineteenth-century Romantic painting 
offered the broad impressions of nature of William Turner (1775–
1851) announcing the twentieth-century impressionist painter, Claude 
Monet (1840–1926) with his own indistinct pattern of color areas, and 
the expressionist and symbolic Norwegian painter, Edvard Munch 
(1863–1944) — later, followed by a group of abstract (that is, non-
representational and non-objective) painters, such as Wassily Kan-
dinsky (1866–1944) and others (Holtzman 1994: 69–84). The mystical 
Firstness of the painture of almost “nothing” adds an undetermined 
sparkle of light and colors with colored shadows, and creates new 
signs and new objects in the visible images, suggesting a possibility of 
interpretants. 
William Turner (1775–1851) worked as an aquarellist and later as a 
painter. The sea and Alpine landscapes of his late works were, however, 
composed not from real life but impromptu before the finished design, 
taken from the many vistas of Turner’s sketchbook drawings made on 
the natural spot. The totality of 20,000 watercolor studies, such as 
Landscape with Water, Norham Castle, Sunrise, Sunrise over the 
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Waters, Sunsetting over the Lake, Snow Storm and many others were 
made as his private work, and were not appreciated by his contem-
poraries as sellable art (Reynolds 1976: 139–149, 186 ills.). Turner’s 
improvisatory epoch with purely chromatic watercolors without any 
fixed contour but with sketched blots, lines, and stripes is now called 
his important (and capitalized) “Colour Beginnings” (1820–1840) by 
the Turner Bequest of the British Museum. Turner’s drawings are 
“thrillingly minimal and airy” traces (Updike 2008a: 14) of 
 
[...] the main ingredients of painting, form, light and colour [...] making 
steam, smoke, mist [...] So in the later finished pictures he [Turner] 
composes in colour, dissolving, suggesting, and only half-defining, form; 
in his private exercise he composed in coloured washes alone, virtually 
excluding any reference to the forms of nature, unless we regard them as 
veiled areas of sky, earth, and sea. (Reynolds 1976: 146, 149) 
 
Some of the ambiguous “beginnings” of the First landscapes were 
probably later “helped” by Turner to form a Second whole: see what he 
did to his miraculous Sunrise with Sea Monster (c.1840–1845), which 
originally was an indeterminate Sunrise. At some point, the spare form 
was thought to be “unfinished” and in order to form a completeness, 
Turner added in the center the form of a cryptic sea monster (Warrell 
2007: 198). Turner’s unprepared Firstness can be prepared for Second-
ness, when necessary (Updike 2008a). 
The response from the realistic Impressionist painters, particularly 
Claude Monet (1840–1926), was to follow Turner’s example to paint 
the fleeting impressions of what the word Impressionism meant. 
Monet’s oil on canvas of 1872–1873, called Impression, Soleil levant 
(Impression, Sunrise), is a rapid rendering of a seascape drawn in free 
and loose brush strokes and colors. Monet depicted a harbor at dawn 
with the seascape, small boats and quayside cranes, with the sun 
coming up (Delafond and Genet-Bondeville 2002: 18–19). Impression 
looks absolutely Turner-like. By 1897, in paintings such as Vétheuil 
dans le brouillard (Vétheuil in the fog), Monet painted in Turner-like 
strokes the village Vétheuil on the cliffs of the right bank of the Seine 
with an eerie shadow of its château (Delafond and Genet-Bondeville 
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2002: 30–32). Beyond these and other paintings or pastels, the quick 
pencil sketches of his notebook were full of penciled pages. They were 
“unknown” sketches, but they brought to light “unknown facts” about 
Monet’s painting life and about “the far greater part that drawings had 
in his career than previously thought” (Herbert 2007: 31). Monet used 
his soft-gray drawings as his “private space” to be used as “sponta-
neous” preparation for his known oils on canvas. The drawings are 
absolute Firsts; they give “no hints of tonal structure, color or detail” 
but are inaccurate “memory clues” of visual ideas (Herbert 2007: 31–
32). The drawings are recently exposed and analyzed for the first time 
in the Monet’s collections of the Musée Marmottan in Paris. 
Monet’s collection of water lilies is the best example. He painted 
the series of Nymphéas (Water Lilies) in his own garden at Giverny 
from 1897 until his death in 1926 (Delafond and Genet-Bondeville 
2002: 59–101). Nearly blind, Monet worked 
 
[...] on his giant canvases in a windowless studio, he brought back the 
sketchbook and independent drawings he made at the edges of the pond 
to serve as memory clues while he painted [...] Some of them probably 
guided initial compositions, which were then developed and altered over 
sessions that lasted months and years. (Herbert 2007: 32 ills.)  
 
By now, times have changed and “most museum visitors have learned 
that Monet’s pictures ostensibly devoted to spontaneity were actually 
constructed with the cunning of a gifted craftsman” (Herbert 2007: 32). 
He accurately used the evocative drawings of his first pastels made 
before of the country scenes, seascapes or fishermen, and his con-
ceptual sketches announced the postimpressionists as Paul Cézanne’s 
(1839–1906) distortions and Vincent van Gogh’s (1853–1890) flam-
boyant colors to end in the totally modern art of the twentieth century, 
disrupting in the purist Dutch painter Piet Mondriaan (1872–1944), 
whose non-figurative technique concentrated on geometric precision. 
Remembering traditional Islamic art, Mondriaan’s abstract paintings 
are the pure geometries of horizontals, verticals, and diagonals, 
eliminating brushstrokes, away from the contours of life and reality — 
pure Firsts. 
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As final example of artistic Firstness, the innocence and mystery of 
Firstness is pictured by Michelangelo Antonioni’s (1912–2006) film 
Blow-Up (1966, ex. 2005). In the film, the unreflective limitations of 
Firstness traverses the ambiguity of reality, just as human reality seems 
to be for the possible self. The visual interface of Blow-Up is a quest of 
imagery without many words, interpreting fantasy into reality to 
bridge the gap between pattern and process. The stream of conscious-
ness of the film gives ample room for the viewers’ own interpretation 
of what happened (or not happened) in the famous images of the 
episode of the park. One day, a high-fashion photographer becomes 
bored with fashion and takes pictures in a deserted park. Against the 
bushes, he takes photos of a lover’s rendezvous. The next day, the 
woman asks him for the ilicit photos. The images that he has 
unwittingly witnessed have an invisible scene of sexual intrigue. When 
the photographer blows up several pictures from the park, the mag-
nified pictures reveal a potential or real murder happening in the 
shadows of some bushes. Further blow-ups from negative to poster 
uncover what could be an image of a dead body.  
Not only is Antonioni’s avant-garde film a fascinating portrait of 
the “swinging” London of the 1960s, with drugs, sex, and wild parties, 
the filmic world also constructs with the visual observations, fallacies, 
and deceptions a spiritual thriller with an accidental death. The 
detective images of a photographer wandering with a camera in his 
hand through the park are followed by his investigative techniques 
and mind-binding magnified images in his studio to see the mis-
adventure of the “real” truth. Yet the truth of the image-maker’s lens, 
doubly mediated by Antonioni’s camera as well as the view of the 
spectators of the film, leaves the aesthetic still-image of the park with 
practically nothing — again a pure First. The visible-invisible and the 
representational-unrepresentational images do give some evidence but 
provide no proof of the murder (Gardner 2002). 
Blow-Up (1966) was a modern avant-garde film discussed in Metz’s 
book Film Language (Metz 1974: 185–227, in the original French ed. 
of 1968) and more specifically in Lotman’s article “Problems of 
semiotics and directions of contemporary cinematography” (Lotman 
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1976: 97–106; originally published in 1973 as Semiotika kino i prob-
lemy kinoestetiki), seen from structuralist semiotics. Metz (1974: 193–
194, 185) spoke about “dead spaces” within the main scenes of the film, 
where the movement has filmically turned into a non-dramatic story, 
the Firstness of doing “nothing” in the quiet park. The breakdown of 
the narrative syntax of semiotic events makes that “nothing” is turned 
into the freedom of undetermined Firstness. Firstness is involved in 
the random scenes that imply “nothing other than a non-codified 
mobility of the camera, a movement that is truly free” (Metz 1974: 48).  
Lotman took a contrary view of Metz’s “dead spaces” and he 
attempted to “capture the face of contemporary life in unposed, un-
arranged and documentary-like” cinema (Lotman 1976: 97). Lotman 
observed that Blow-Up offers the frozen images of (transposed into 
Peirce’s terminology) an unfulfilled First, contrasted with the semiotic 
nature of moving (photographic, motion-picture, etc.) images fulfilled 
into Secondness. The film wanders around the party scene of London 
as a travelogue of the wandering and struggling signs of Secondness. 
Yet in the central episode of the images of the lonely park, the viewers 
are given the broad field of vision of the bushes and the kissing couple. 
The episode is pictured by the accidental photographer, taking sponta-
neous (non-professional) close-ups to please himself. The random 
scene in the park remains uninterpreted Firstness in itself. The “real-
ness” of the “document about reality” (Lotman 1976: 98) lies in the 
photographs taken and the film images themselves.  
The mystery raised by Blow-Up is half-cleared up by the blow-ups. 
Lotman (1976: 103) wrote that the photographer was a “modern 
chronicler” acting as a 
 
[...] criminologist [working] with a photodocument and a visual aid in 
researching the semiotics of depictions. [...] Ordinarily both the historian 
and the criminologist see their task as the establishing of life from a 
document. Here a different task is formulated: to interpret life with the aid 
of a document, since the audience has seen for itself that direct 
observation of life is no guarantee that profound mistakes will not occur. 
The “obvious” fact is by no means so obvious. (Lotman 1976: 100) 
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The film is an abductive metatext, with a wider degree between chaos 
and order. The meaning of the film is what can happen to under-
developed and open-ended Firstness. This makes that meaning in 
artistic signs stays conjectural and that there is (and will not be in the 
future) no absolute truth in art. 
 
 
8. Concluding remarks 
 
The painters, composers, and film-makers discussed explain the rise of 
the abductive “‘art of the fact” which has opposed the ‘art of the ideas’” 
(Lotman 1976: 103), from outside ideas to inside things. This 
abduction signifies not logical reasoning but is backward reasoning, a 
mythology based on hunches and guessing, whereas the emotional 
overtones build opportune opportunities of both “may” and “maybe 
not”. In Peirce’s semiotics, the art of the inside thing could suggest art 
for art’s sake, but not exactly: 
 
Only in the Western world is art produced for art’s sake, to be hung in 
museums and galleries or to be performed in concert before large 
audiences. In the societies that anthropologists typically study, art is 
embedded in the culture. It is actively used in the performance of 
ceremony and ritual, and the meanings the art is communicating relate 
to the meaning of the ritual and the mythology associated with it. 
(Rosman and Rubel 1989: 222) 
 
A work of art is a visible and functional fact, not only displayed in the 
organized exhibition of museums but everywhere. If any genera-
lization can be made about this long history of art, it is perhaps that 
the idea of perfect form combined with simple substance has already 
prevailed. 
The engaging simplicity of the themes of Firstness (from pre-
Firstness) has the genius for transmuting the mystic view of fresh ideas 
into poetry. Evaluating the instrumental naturalism of physical and 
spontaneous undegenerate art and coming face-to-face with an 
anthropological vision of pseudo-art, the word of art reaches the 
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principal mode of artistic expression of a creative artist — from double 
to single degeneracy. The work of art creates the meaning of a single 
monolith in a minimal (or perhaps monumental) created object that 
in the undetermined interpretants explores the secret qualities that 
seem actively involved in the sign and the object, emerge in the (still 
undetermined) interpretants. In the practical example, the bronze bells 
with the natural associations of their sounds, the (dis)ambiguity of the 
vague riflesso (reflex) of the vaguely liturgical — romantic, nostalgic, 
religious, mystic, atavistic, archaic — icons produce in the viewers-
listeners an emotional ecstasy; but since the work of art is and will 
remain a fictional task, the meaning of Firstness is too narrow, and the 
real truth can be far away from the epiphany. The sporadic transfor-
mation (transition, translation) process of making and giving further 
cultural meaning(s) arises from the exterior context, that is the motivic 
words and fragments indicating the self-contained and self-referred 
qualities of Firstness, directing to an awareness of Secondness. The 
artistic signs with their partially known and unknown objects acquire 
in the mind of the attentive receiver (reader, listener, visitor) impro-
visatory and possible interpretants. 
The spare sign of pure Firstness gives a pseudo-religious (or a 
mystic, spiritual, or animistic) feeling to the vagueness and abstraction 
of the work of art. The minimal significance of human emotion could 
transform “upwards” into Secondness, concentrating on the real state 
in the sign’s reality. In Secondness, the sign can episodically unfold 
into a more complex mood, key and material, thereby in advanced 
stages receiving all kinds of spiritual or temperamental interpretants, 
invoking primitive rites and judging the artistic composition made by 
individual artists. The fragments of Firstness conjure something for 
nothing. The musement of something and nothing starts with the pre-
historic and pre-industrial, yet visionary, impressions of the nature-
mythical passages: reprising the primordial flux of Creation with the 
basic qualities of the innocent Firstness of Nature, yet with a hidden 
and creative focus of achieving real Secondness and touching the 
formal rules of Thirdness. The moments of minimalist Firstness 
contain the spiritual principles of the human person to achieve the 
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cosmos. Seeing, hearing, listening, and touching in the artwork the 
magical moments of self-concentration is the direct experience of the 
oneness of the sign’s qualities. Totally, within and beyond ourselves as 
sign receivers, Firstness proves a vague, unfulfilled sign, ready to fulfill 
the total sign-semiosis. 
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1995. Kronos Quartet. CD Nonesuch Records 7559 79394 2. 
Messiaen, Olivier (ex. 2004). Eclairs sur l’au-delà ... Berliner Philharmoniker 
Orchestra, Sir Simon Rattle (conductor). CD Emi Classics 5 57788 2. 
Pärt, Arvo (ex. 1995). Fratres. In: Released 1985–1995 by Kronos Quartet. 
Nonesuch Records CD 7559 79394 2. 
—  (ex. 1997). Psalom. In: Early Music by Kronos Quartet. Nonesuch Records CD 
7559 79457 2. 
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Saint-Saëns, Camille (ex. 2001). Symphony No. 3 in C minor, Op. 78 Organ. 
Orchestre de la Société des Concerts du Conservatoire conducted, Maurice 
Duruflé (conductor). CD Emi Classics 5 74587 2. [With Francis Poulenc] 
Satie, Erik (ex. 1971 [1966]). Oeuvres pour piano. Aldo Ciccolini (piano). CD Emi 
Classics 5 75335 2. 
—  (ex. 1995). Gnossiennes, Ogives, Petite ouverture à danser, Sarabande, Gym-
nopédies. Reinbert de Leeuw (piano). Philips Digital Classics CD 446 672 2. 
Sibelius, Jean (ex. 1991). Sir Thomas Beecham Conducts Sibelius. The London 
Philharmonic Orchestra, Sir Thomas Beecham (conductor). Koch Legacy CD 
3 7061 2 H1. 
—  (ex. 1998a [1956]). Tone Poems. Vol. 2. The London Philharmonic Orchestra, 
Sir Adrian Boult (conductor). Omega Classics OCD 1028. 
—  (ex. 1998b). Inner Voices. String Quartets by Sibelius and Grieg. New Helsinki 
Quartet. Finlandia CD 3984 21445 2. 
Villa-Lobos, Heitor (ex. 1991). A Floresta do Amazonas. Musical ensemble by João 
Carlos Assis Brasil (piano), Ney Matogrosso (voice), Wagner Tiso (piano, 
samples, synthesizers), Jaques Morelenbaum (violoncello) and Jurim Moreira 
(drums). CD Paixão 3 306649 10363 (NTI 396). 
—  (ex. 1996). Orchestral Works. Jena Philharmonic Orchestra, David Montgo-
mery (conductor). Marco Antonio de Almeida (piano). CD Arte Nova 74321 
54465 2. 
Wagner, Richard (ex. 1998). Das Rheingold. Berliner Philharmoniker Orchestra, 
Herbert von Karajan (conductor). 2 CD Deutsche Grammophon 2 457 783 
[with Wagner's libretto]. 
 
 
Набросок категории Первичности Пирса и  
ее значение для искусства 
 
Данное эссе рассказывает о создании и развитии пирсовских трех 
категорий, сосредоточиваясь прежде всего на Первичности, на ее 
базовой формуле «воздушного ничто» (CP: 6.455), которая действует 
как фрагмент Вторичности и Третичности. Категории чувствования, 
хотения и знания не являются обособленными, они действуют во 
взаимосвязи с тремя интерпретантами. Интерпретанты действуют в 
качестве элементов триады благодаря принятию, изменению или 
перемене верований. В произведениях искусства первое дыхание 
Первичности вызывает спонтанную реакцию musement , где эмоции 
выражаются без сопротивления фактов Вторичности и применения 
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логики Третичности. Основные качества туманного и неясного слова, 
краски или звука несут свои мимолетные значения в Первичности. 
Первичные качества вкуса, взмаха кисти, тембра, краски, точки, ли-
нии или прикосновения слишком скудны, чтоб на них строить логи-
ку эстетической оценки. Возникновение искусства Пирс объясняет 
ростом «невырожденности» (undegeneracy) в групповые и индиви-
дуальные интерпретанты и возникновением констелляций единич-
ных и двоичных форм вырожденности  (degeneracy). Обзор «проблес-
ков» Первичности сопровождается множеством примеров ее 
проявления в произведениях искусства (литература, музыка, скульп-
тура, изобразительное искусство, кино). Настоящий анализ является 
первым этапом на пути изучения Первичности в искусстве. 
 
 
Visand Peirce’i Esmasuse kategooriast ja  
selle tähendusest kunstidele 
 
Käesolev essee räägib Peirce’i kolme kategooria loomisest ja arengust, 
keskendudes seejuures esmajärjekorras Peirce’i Esmasusele, tema “õhulise 
mittemillegi” alusvalemile (CP: 6.455), mis toimib Teisesuse ja Kolmasuse 
fragmendina. Tundmise, soovimise ja teadmise kategooriad ei ole eraldi-
seisvad üksused, vaid toimivad vastastikuses koostoimes kolme tõlgendiga. 
Tõlgendid toimivad kolmiksuhteliste elementidena tänu sisseharjunud 
uskumuste kasutamisele, muutmisele või ümber tegemisele. Kunstiteostes 
kutsub Esmasuse esimene hõng esile “mõtiskluse” (musement) spontaanse 
reaktsiooni, kus emotsioone väljendatakse ilma faktilise loomusega Teise-
suse vastuseisuta ja loogilise Kolmasuse osaluseta. Ähmase ja ebaselge 
sõna, värvi ja heli põhiomadused kannavad oma põgusaid tähendusi edasi 
Esmasuses. Esteetilise objekti maitse, pintslitõmbe, tämbri, värvi, punkti, 
joone, tooni või puudutuse Esmased omadused on liiga napid, et nendele 
ehitada esteetilise hinnangu loogikat. Kunsti tärkamist seletab Peirce’i 
eba-degeneratiivsuse (undegeneracy) kasvamine grupiviisilisteks ja indivi-
duaalseteks tõlgenditeks ning degeneratiivsuse (degeneracy) üksik- ja 
kaksikvormide konstellatsioonide moodustumine. Esmasuse välgatuse 
ülevaates tuuakse näiteid paljudest kunstiteostest nii sõnas, muusikas, 
skulptuuris, maalis kui filmis. Käesolev analüüs on esmane abimees pri-
maarse Esmasuse uurimisel Kunstis. 
